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SĀMKHYA OR THE THEORY OF REALITY.

A CRITICAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE
STUDY OF
ĪŚVARAKRSNA'S SĀMKHYA-KĀRIKĀ.

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IN
MEMORY
OF
MY DEAR BELOVED
MOTHER

whose tribe has suffered
untold and undeserved in-
dignity at the hands of
unworthy Sāmkhists who
preach that women are the
incarnations of a vile, vici-
ous and beguiling Prakṛti.

PREFACE.

The usual custom of offering an apology for writing and publishing a book becomes an imperative necessity when the obvious object of the writer is to challenge deep-rooted beliefs and convictions. The present volume makes no secret of the fact that it professes to question the validity of the current account of the origin and nature of the Sāṃkhya philosophy.

The student of Sāṃkhya is conscious of the many problems that beset him on all sides. But no problem has baffled him more than the one concerning the nature of the original Sāṃkhya philosophy. He is faced with the fact that the philosophy of Sāṃkhya-Kārikā does not see eye to eye with the accounts of Sāṃkhya given in Kāṭha, Śvetāśvatara and the Gītā. When he refers to the Mahabharata he finds a bewildering variety of tenets and principles all passing muster for the Sāṃkhya philosophy. The opinion has, therefore, been generally favoured that there was no systematic Sāṃkhya at the pre-Kārikā stage. The critical student may go a step further and declare that Sāṃkhya has never been a systematic philosophy. This would be amply justified if Sāṃkhya be what the authoritative commentators say that it is.

For reasons that have been fully stated in the following pages, we have been led to the conclusion that the ruling Sāṃkhya is a distorted, deformed and defaced edition of the genuine Sāṃkhya which has been sought to be driven underground, like so many things of India's far-reaching past, to suit the exigencies of rolling centuries and ages. This is only an instance of the gigantic cultural conflicts that are written large in the pages of Indian history.

What we have done is simply the application of, what may be called, the spade-and-shovel method of the archæo-

logist to the treatise called Sāṃkhya-Karikā and attributed to Iśvara-kṛṣṇa. We have tried to remove, layer by layer, all later accretions with the sole object of reclaiming the original Sāṃkhya philosophy. We have denied both Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati the privilege of leading us blind-folded by the nose. We have made bold to submit them to a rational survey. If anybody resents this procedure on our part we have for him in our pocket the charter of freedom signed, sealed and solemnised by Sāṃkhya itself.

What we have found is striking, shocking and something unthought of in the domain of Indian speculation. It is a theory of Reality and Life that rebels against the doctrine of salvation that Sāṃkhya is said to be. We have noticed in Sāṃkhya-Karikā a doctrine of Duḥkha and Mokṣa trying to yoke a demonstrative philosophy of Reality and Life developing round the concepts of Bandha and Siddhi.

The two Sāṃkhyas in Sāṃkhya-Karikā may be separated from each other. The first fifty-two Karikas without the term Duḥkha contain the genuine Sāṃkhya, while the sixteen Karikas from 53 to 68 propound the false Sāṃkhya. The latter is pretty well-known. We shall here try to give an outline of what the former is.

Sāṃkhya means and is the theory of Reality. Reality, according to it, is, as Dahlmann has said, a triune-unity. We differ, however, from Dahlmann in holding that this triune-unity is not to be found in its genuine form in either Kaṭha or Śvetāśvatara. It is, as the 2nd Karikā puts it, the unity of Vyaktavyaktajñā. Reality is not an aspectless unity but a unity of differentiated aspects. It is a "dynamic Order."

The concept of Order is the fundamental concept of Sāṃkhya. Jñā is the central principle of this Order, ever meaning Avyakta and through its medium the society of personal-objective orders called Vyaktas or better Vyaktis.

Knowledge is only another name for this Order. But as involving a society of personal-objective orders, there is also a moral order. Morality is the quality of the interpersonal relations. These interpersonal relations are, according to Sāṃkhya, the social functions of Vacana, Ādāna etc. otherwise called Karma-Indriyas. Ānanda or Art is included in these social functions. The position of Sāṃkhya has been perfectly cleared by the division of the necessary Indriyas of Liṅga-Puruṣa into Buddhi-Indriyas or logical or objectifying functions and Karma-Indriyas or social or moral functions. The former are concerned with the construction of the objective order of facts, the latter with that of the social order of persons. Reality or Knowledge (and, therefore, Liṅga-Puruṣa also) is the dynamic Order in which two orders may be distinguished. They are the orders of Science (Jñāna or Buddha) and Morality or Conduct (Karma or Dharma). This latter includes the order of Art. This explains Jñāna-Karma-Samuccaya of the Gīta and indicates the source of the concept of Triratna of Buddhism.

We have said that Reality, according to Sāṃkhya, is a dynamic Order. That it is so will be evident from the fact that it is a Puruṣārthahetuka Nimitta-Naimittika-Prasaṅga. Puruṣārtha is a dynamic concept. It means Reason and Conscience. Reason demands Science. Conscience demands Conduct. It is significant, therefore, that Sāṃkhya has styled itself as Puruṣārthajñāna.

Reality being thus a *dynamic* logical-moral order, it must be conceived as a perpetual *ordering*. Disorder and chaos, discord and confusion, error and evil or Viparyaya and Asakti are necessarily involved in Reality. The antagonism of Sattva and Tamas and the necessary place that they occupy in Reality are thus highly significant.

Science is a perpetual crusade against Nescience, Morality against misconduct or untruth and injustice and

Art against deformity and distortion. The mythological fables in the Purāṇas¹ of the many battles between the gods and the demons and the realistic reference to Kurukṣetra² as something necessary for the maintenance of the order of Truth and Justice against the onslaughts of the forces of disorder and disruption are only different enumerations of the inherent conflict in any truly conceived dynamic order.

The concept of Reality as *ordering* disorder is as old as Rgvedic Rta and its necessary implicate Anṛta. The story of Kasyapa giving birth to Ādityas and Daityas by his two wives Aditi and Diti respectively is only the mythical illustration of this very concept of Reality. Ādityas and Daityas are eternally at war. This war, this conflict is the very life and soul of Reality.

Divested of myth and metaphor, this conflict assumes the form of an eternal interrogation and a never-ending call for action. It is both Tattvajijñāsa and Karma or Dharmajijñāsa including Rasaprerana or artistic urge. Viewed logically, Reality as Jijñāsa is an eternal Dialectic. Viewed ethically, Reality is a perpetual call for readjustment of interpersonal relations. Dialectic demands Science. Personal relations demand Morality and Art, or Conduct and Ästhetic enjoyment.

Jijñāsa presupposes Bandha and anticipates Vijñāna. Special Jijñāsas presuppose special Bandhas and anticipate the special sciences. General Jijñāsa presupposes general Bandha and anticipates philosophy. Philosophy is the self-comprehension of Reality. Saṃkhya is such a philosophy. It explains the general structure of Reality as Dialectic or Jijñāsa and comprehends both Tattva and Dhārma Jijñāsa.*

¹ e. g. Chāndī

* Gita Ch. IV., 7 and 8.

We are now in a position to understand the real import of the first two *Karikas*. *Jijñāsa* is a call for the conquest of Bandha. It is, therefore, due to the reaction or *Abhighata* of Bandha and is directed to its annihilation or *Apaghata*.

There is no logical place for *Duhkha* in the first *Karika*, simply because *Sāmkhya* has recognised that the logical necessity for Science or *Jijñāsa* is more fundamental than the pragmatic or hedonistic necessity of *Duhkhpaghata*. Again, *Ekānta* and *Atyanta Abhāva* does not refer to *Duhkha* or, as we would say, Bandha but to *Jijñāsa*. The meaning is that there is no end or termination of *Jijñāsa*. *Puruṣartha* or Reason or Meaning without perpetual self-interrogation is an impossible conception. Such a final and absolute end of *Jijñāsa* would mean the suicide of *Puruṣartha*. Hence it is that the first *Siddhi* is *Uha*.

Reality being *Jijñāsa*, nothing else, neither *Anuśravika* nor *Driṣṭa* can take its place. *Sāmkhya Jijñāsa* is, therefore, neither superfluous nor meaningless. It has a deep significance. It is *Puruṣarthajñāna* or the philosophy of Reason or Meaning. Instead of negating the special sciences, it puts them in their proper place. Reason with its inherent *Jijñāsa* is the perennial source of Philosophy or Science and Sciences.

The duty of each person (male or female) or the individual, according to *Sāmkhya*, can only be the cultivation of Science and sciences on the one hand, and the maintenance of the moral order of personal relations including the artistic order of personal enjoyment on the other. In other words, the duty of each person consists in the unceasing cultivation of Science, Morality and Art. This is the ideal of *Jñāna-Karma-Samuccaya* traces of which are found in the *Gita*. The individual has value so far as he or she realises the orders of the True, the Just and the Beautiful. The person has no value so far as he or she rebels against these orders or the

Order. This is the burden of the teachings of Śrī Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna. Again, universal love does not cancel the necessity of a vigorous campaign against untruth and injustice.

Here we are again reminded of Dahlmann. We fully endorse his contention that Sāṃkhya is the dominant philosophy of the Mahābhārata and that this Epic teaches a single self-consistent ethico-philosophical view. We differ from him only in so far as we hold that the Mahābhārata was originally intended to teach the Sāṃkhya theory of Conduct or the Sāṃkhya Ethics. The story that is the nucleus of the Mahābhārata is nothing but the illustration of the Sāṃkhya culture. Śrī Kṛṣṇa is Puruṣa. The five Pāñdavas are the Sattvika Karma-functions of Vacana, Ādāna, Viharaṇa and Utsarga. Yudhiṣṭhira, the son of Dharma, personifies Sattvika Vacana. Bhīma, the son of Pavana, is the incarnation of Śakti involved in Ādāna or the assertion of rights. Arjuna, the son of Indra or Mitra personifies Viharaṇa or fellowship or companionship. He is Kṛṣṇasakha. Prowess for the maintenance of the order of Truth and Justice has its source in Fellowship or Universal Love. The twins, the sons of Aśvinikumāras personify Utsarga or service or the discharging of duties or devotion. Service is represented by the twins because it benefits both the individual and the order. Draupadī is Ānanda. She is the impersonation of Art. Arjuna wins Draupadī and yet all the brothers marry her, simply because Art is wedded to social functions through fellowship which is the mainspring of all social relations.

Kauravas personify the Tamasika Karma-functions born of the blind usurper Dhṛitarāṣṭra. Evil is blind and multiple. The names of the Kauravas are invariably preceded by the prefix 'Du' meaning bad. The entire life-history of the Pāñdavas is an unceasing tale of persecution at the hands of the Kauravas. The Pāñdavas are the emblems of fortitude, reliance, resignation, contentment and

wisdom. They suffer all, bear all the treachery and perfidy of the Kauravas with deserving nobility and loftiness of heart. But at last the supreme call of the order of Truth and Justice asserts itself and Kurukṣetra becomes inevitable. The cause of Justice rises above the considerations of fellowship. Arjuna had to be reminded of this and hence the invaluable Kṛṣṇarjunasamivāda or the original Bhagavadgītā.

Kurukṣetra is life. It is the perpetual war between the Sattvika and the Tamasika Karma-functions. It is inevitable for the proper adjustment of interpersonal relations. It is a never-ending war. It is a war that is perfectly consistent with universal love or human fellowship ; for, it is directed towards the maintenance of that fellowship in its genuine form. It is a war against the abuse of fellowship. This is why Arjuna is the hero of Kurukṣetra.

We hold, for these reasons, that Saṃkhya was the ruling philosophy of the pre-Buddhistic Epic culture. This Epic culture began as a reaction against the faith in super-rational authority and the ritualistic ethics of the Brāhmaṇas. The peculiar features of the Epic culture are its broad-based Humanism, Rationalism and the consequent distaste for the supernatural. The most convincing evidence of this contention is found in the logical outlook of Saṃkhya and the new significance attached to the concept of Karma. Karma is no longer the performance of the formalistic rituals but the proper discharge of the social functions of Vacana, Ādāna etc. which are necessarily involved in the constitution of Linga-Purusas.

This Epic culture, we venture to think, is writ large in original Buddhism in its Logic and Ethics. Buddhism is not a cult but a *culture*. Its Logic is its Metaphysics and its Ethics is human. Vijñānavāda Buddhism is the direct offspring of Saṃkhya. Its Logic and its Ethics have

been hopelessly misunderstood. The concepts of Triratna and Nirvāṇa are the keynotes of Buddhism.¹ Nirvāṇa is dedication to Triratna, *viz.* Saṅgha or the dynamic Order, Buddha or the Order of Science and Sciences and Dharma or the Order of Conduct or Justice or Morality. We only hope that some worthy hand will take up the stupendous work of redeeming Buddhism from its present state of ignominy.

We offer our thanks to all those who have rendered ungrudging assistance and beg to mention specially the names of my colleagues, Messrs S. P. Chaturvedi, M. A., M. N. Mitra, M. A., R. C. Guha, M. A., my student Mr. S. N. Misra, B. A. and my brother Mr. S. N. Mukerji, M. A. We offer our apologies for the many short-comings of the book and our respectful Pranams to the great teachers Kapila, Kṛṣṇa and Buddha.

Saṅgham	Saṇṇam	Gacchāmi
Buddham	"	"
Dharmaṁ	"	"

MANGALALAYA, NAGPUR, }
24-12-30 }

J. N. MUKERJI.

¹ Cf. the concept of Bodhisattva.

(सांख्य-कारिका)

दुःखत्रयाभिधाताज्ज्ञिनसा तदपधातके हेतौ ।
 दृष्टेसाऽपार्था चेन्नैकान्तत्यन्ततोऽभावात् ॥१॥
 दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः, स क्षविशुद्धित्यातिशययुक्तः ।
 तद्विपरीतः शोयानं, व्यक्ताव्यक्तश्विज्ञानात् ॥२॥
 मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।
 षोडशकस्तु विकारो, न प्रकृतिर्विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥३॥
 दृष्टमनुमानमासवचनं च, सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ।
 त्रिविधम्ब्रमाणमिष्टं, प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि ॥४॥
 प्रतिविषयाद्यवसायो दृष्टं, त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातः ।
 तलिङ्गलिङ्गपूर्वकम्, आसश्रुतिरासवचनं तु ॥५॥
 सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टात् अतीन्द्रियाणाम्प्रतीतिरनुमानात् ।
 तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोऽप्तमासागमात् सिद्धम् ॥६॥
 अतिदूरात् सामीप्यात् इन्द्रियधातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।
 सौक्ष्म्याद्यवधानात् अभिभवात् समानाभिहाराच्च ॥७॥
 सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिर्नाभावात्, कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेः ।
 महदादि तत्त्व कार्यं प्रकृतिसरूपं विरूपं च ॥८॥
 असद्करणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसंभवाभावात् ।
 शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्, कारणभावाच्चसत्कार्यम् ॥९॥
 हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि नक्षियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।
 सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं, विपरीतमव्यक्तः ॥१०॥
 त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः नामान्यमचेतनम्प्रसवधर्मि ।
 व्यक्तं, तथा, प्रधानम्, तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् ॥११॥

प्रीत्यग्रीतिविषादात्मकाः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ।
 अन्योन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च गुणाः ॥१२॥
 सत्वं लघु प्रकाशकमिधः पष्टमकं चलं च रजः ।
 गुरु वरणकमेव तमः, प्रदीपवशार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥१३॥
 अविवेक्यादेः सिद्धिस्तौगुणात्तद्विपर्ययाभावात् ।
 कारणगुणात्मकत्वात्कार्यस्याव्यक्तमपि सिद्धम् ॥१४॥
 भेदानां परिमाणात् समन्वयात् कार्यतः प्रवृत्तोश्च ।
 कारणकार्यविभागादविभागाद्वै श्वरूप्यस्य ॥१५॥
 कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तम्, प्रवर्तते विगुणातः सञ्जद्याश्च ।
 परिणामतः सलिलवत् प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् ॥१६॥
 संधातपरार्थत्वात् विगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।
 पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात्कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तोश्च ॥१७॥
 जननमरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमादयुगपत्रप्रवृत्तोश्च ।
 पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव ॥१८॥
 तस्माश्च विपर्यासात्सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।
 कैवल्यम्माध्यस्थं द्रव्यत्वमकर्तुं भावश्च ॥१९॥
 तस्मात्तसंयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।
 गुणकर्तृत्वे च तथा कर्तव भवत्युदासीनः ॥२०॥
 पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।
 पङ्कवन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥२१॥
 प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद्गणश्च षोडशकः ।
 तस्मादपि षोडशकात्पञ्चम्यः पञ्च भूतानि ॥२२॥
 अध्यवस्तयो द्वुद्धि धर्मोऽक्षानं विराग ऐश्वर्यम् ।
 सात्त्विकमेतद्रूपं तामसमस्माद्विपर्यस्तम् ॥२३॥
 अभिमानोऽहङ्कारः, तस्माद्विधिः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ।
 एकादशकश्च गास्तन्मात्रपञ्चकञ्चैव ॥२४॥

सात्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्ततेवैकृतादहङ्कारात् ।
 भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसः, तैजसादुभयम् ॥२५॥
 बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चन्द्रः शोषणाणरसनत्वगाख्यानि ।
 वाक् पापिपादपायूपस्थानि कर्मन्द्रियाणयाहुः ॥२६॥
 उभयात्मकमत्र मनः, सङ्कल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधम्यात् ।
 गुणपरिणामविशेषाभानात्वं वाहामेदश्च ॥२७॥
 शब्दादिषु पञ्चानामालोचनमात्रमिष्यते वृत्तिः ।
 वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दश्च पञ्चानाम् ॥२८॥
 स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिलक्षणस्य सैषा भवत्यसामान्या ।
 सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥२९॥
 युगपश्चतुष्यस्य तु वृत्तिः क्रमश्च तस्य निर्दिष्टा ।
 दृष्टे तथाऽप्यदृष्टे त्रयस्य तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः ॥३०॥
 स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकूतहेतुकां वृत्तिम् ।
 पुरुषार्थं एव हेतुनं केनचित्कार्यते करणम् ॥३१॥
 करणं त्रयोदशविधम्, तदाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम् ।
 कार्यं च तस्य दशाधार्यं धार्यं प्रकाश्यं च ॥३२॥
 अन्तःकरणां त्रिविधं दशाधा बाह्यं त्रयस्य विषयाख्यम् ।
 साम्रतकालं बाह्यं त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम् ॥३३॥
 बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि तेषां पञ्च विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि ।
 वाग्भवति शब्दविषया शेषाणि तु पञ्चविषयाणि ॥३४॥
 सान्तः करणा बुद्धिः सर्वं विषयमवगाहते यस्मात् ।
 तस्मात्रिविधं करणं द्वारि, द्वाराणि शेषाणि ॥३५॥
 पते प्रदीपकल्याः परस्परविलक्षणा गुणविशेषाः ।
 कृत्स्नं पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाश्य बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ॥३६॥
 सर्वं प्रत्युपभोगं यस्मात्पुरुषस्य साधयति बुद्धिः ।
 सर्वं च विशिनष्टि पुनः प्रधानः यस्मात्तरं सूक्ष्मम् ॥३७॥

तन्मात्रागत्यविशेषाः, तेभ्यो भूतानि पञ्च पञ्चम्यः ।
 पते स्मृता विशेषाः, शान्ता घोराश्च मूढाश्च ॥३८॥
 सूक्ष्मा मातापितृजाः सह प्रभूतैखिधा विशेषाः स्युः ।
 सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियता, मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते ॥३९॥
 पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतम्महादाविसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ।
 संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम् ॥४०॥
 चित्रं यथाश्रयस्मृतेस्थागतादिभ्यो विना यथाच्छाया ।
 तद्विना विशेषैर्न तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् ॥४१॥
 पुरुषार्थहेतुकमिदं निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गं न ।
 प्रकृतेर्विद् त्वयोगान्तवद्वयवतिष्ठते लिङ्गम् ॥४२॥
 सांसिद्धिकाश्च भावाः प्राकृतिका वैकृतिकाश्च धर्माद्याः ।
 दृष्टाः करणाश्रयिणाः कार्याश्रयिणाश्च कललाद्याः ॥४३॥
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 ऐश्वर्यादविद्यातो विपर्ययात्तद्विपर्यासिः ॥४५॥
 एष प्रत्ययसगों विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टि सिद्धशाख्यः ।
 गुणवैषम्य विमर्दात्, तस्य च भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत् ॥४६॥
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 बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च,-नव तुष्टयोऽभिमताः ॥५०॥

ऊहः शब्दोऽन्यथनं तुःखविधाता नवः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः ।
 दानं च सिद्धयोऽष्टौ, सिद्धेः पूर्वोऽद्भुतशिद्विधः ॥५१॥
 न विना भावैलिङ्गं, न विना लिङ्गे न भावनिर्वृत्तिः ।
 लिङ्गाख्यां भावाख्यस्तस्मादद्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ॥५२॥
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 पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते तद्वद्व्यक्तम् ॥५८॥
 रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् ।
 पुरुषस्य तथाऽत्मानं प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥५९॥
 नानाविधैरूपायैरूपकारिण्यनुपकारिणाः पुंसः ।
 गुणावत्यगुणास्यसतस्तस्यार्थमपार्थकञ्चरति ॥६०॥
 प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरञ्ज किञ्चिदस्तीति मे मतिर्भवती ।
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 शास्त्राद्विष्टाद्विष्टाद्विष्टाः परत्वादविवर्जिताश्चापि ॥७२॥

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CHAPTER I.

The Point of View.

It has already been indicated in the preface that Sāṃkhya Kārikas attributed to Īśvarakṛṣṇa, taken as a whole, propound two different and mutually inconsistent philosophies. Our object here is to indicate what the two philosophies are, and where they differ and contradict. It is, indeed, a difficult task, simply because one of the contrasted theories has yet to be established. The reader is, therefore, requested to return to this chapter after going through the whole book.

There is one obvious objection against the hypothesis we have advanced, that 16 Kārikas have been added to the original body. It refers to the view that the Sāṃkhya philosophy is propounded in 70 Kārikas¹. It is also believed that one Kārika is missing and Lokamānya Tilak² tried to restore it. This objection has, however, no force, for the number refers to the remodelled and enlarged Sāṃkhya philosophy,

The points of difference between the two philosophies may be generally stated in the following way :—

The philosophy of Kārikas 1 to 52	The philosophy of Kārikas 53 to 68
1. Starts from the recognition of Bandha.	1. Starts from the recognition of Duhkha.
2. Ends in Siddhi.	2. Ends in Mokṣa or salvation.
3. Understands by Puruṣartha primarily Reason or Logical Meaning and secondarily, Conscience or Moral Meaning.	3. Understands by Puruṣartha Moral End or Summum Bonum only.

The philosophy of Kārikās 1 to 52—(Contd.)

4. Outlook is logical.
5. Avyakta is incapable of existing without Vyakta.
6. Reality is a concrete, constructive process. It is neither Vyakta alone, nor Avyakta alone, nor Jñāna alone but Vyakta-avyaktajñāna. It is eternal.
7. Jñāna is the ultimate and universal principle of Meaning. Jñāna-Avyakta is realised in a number of Linga-Puruṣas.
8. Evolution is not due to ignorance and is never extinguished. Knowledge means the construction of the objective. Morality means the construction of the moral order.

The philosophy of Kārikās 53 to 68—(Contd.)

4. Outlook is psychological.
5. Avyakta is capable of existing without Vyakta.
6. Avyakta evolves in time and its evolution is an event in time. Consequently, it has a beginning and an end.
7. A plurality of passive Puruṣas with the active principle of Avyakta is ultimate.
8. Evolution is due to ignorance. Knowledge means its extinction and the withdrawal of the objective. Morality means the denial of social life.

It is not possible to develop all these points at once. The whole of the present volume has been found necessary for that purpose. We shall here point out one change that the author of the 16 added Kārikās must have introduced into the original philosophy. We hold that there is no room for the term Duḥkha in the first 52 Kārikās, unless it is understood to be only another name for ignorance or error concerning the true and the just. It occurs twice within that range and in both the places it requires to be replaced by Bandha. The first Kārikā should be understood to refer to Bandhatraya and not to

Duhkhatraya, and the 51st Kārika to refer to Bandha-Vighatāstraya and not to Duhkha-Vighatāstraya. One of the added Kārikās, viz. the 55th also refers to Duhkha. But there it is described as due to old age and death. This account does not agree with the account of Duhkhatraya, generally given and accepted without criticism. On the other hand, the 44th Kārika refers to Bandhatraya and it is perfectly legitimate to hold that the enquiry or investigation, called the Sāṃkhya philosophy, is concerned with the annihilation of three Bandhas or errors.

The three kinds of Duhkhas are said to be Ādhibhautika, Ādhidaivika and Ādhyātmika.

Vācaspati says that Ādhibhautika Duhkha is pain due to Bhūtas or inanimate things and animate creatures, Ādhidaivika to Yakṣa, Piśāca etc., and Ādhyātmika is said to be either bodily or mental. The question now is : Are not the former two also either bodily or mental or both ? The difficulty is too obvious to be ignored. Hence Vācaspati hastens to say that Ādhyātmika pains are so called because they submit to internal remedies, while the former two are capable of being cured by external remedies. Are we to suppose, then, that ointments for bodily pains were unknown and accept that wife and children and property are wholly internal remedies ? This classification is, in the first place, simply hopeless. It is overlapping in every respect and introduces Yakṣa, Piśāca, talisman, amulet etc., which are, to say the least, not philosophical concepts.

Secondly, it is curious that Duhkhas have not been traced to Ajñāna or error. Yet it is necessary that it should be done, simply because the second Kārika definitely states that Vijñāna or knowledge is the unfailing and ultimate remedy. It is a commonplace that whatever can be cured by knowledge must be due to ignorance or error. It is not possible to find out who is responsible for the introduction and interpolation of Duhkhas given by

Gauḍapāda, Vacaspati and others. But it is certainly out of tune with the basic ideas of the Sāṃkhya philosophy.

Thirdly, even if the term Duḥkha be retained, it must be traced to Bandha, and Bandha to ignorance as stated in the 24th Kārikā. The cessation of Duḥkha is the necessary consequence of the removal of errors. Consequently, it is natural to expect that Sāṃkhya should be concerned more with the errors than with Duḥkhas. Any elaborate classification of Duḥkhas is superfluous.

Fourthly, we shall show that the Sāṃkhya philosophy does not hold that existence or life is necessarily an evil. On the other hand, it is positively worth living and being enjoyed. There is Duḥkha but it is not the whole of our life. Experiencing and feeling pain are not synonymous. There is Sattva or Pṛiti or delightful experience, and Ānanda is one of the constituents of Linga. Duḥkhavāda, as given in Kārikā 55, is, therefore, foreign to the Sāṃkhya philosophy.

We conclude, therefore, that Sāṃkhya is not troubled by pessimism and that the terms Ādhibhautika etc. refer to Bandhās or errors and not to Duḥkhas. But what do they mean then ?

It is, indeed, a difficult task to determine their meaning ; for, there is a mystery hanging about them. It is certain, however, that they have been derived from the terms Adhibhūta, Adhyatma and Adhidevata or Adhideva. In the Mahābhārata (Santi-Parva Ch. 313) the author promises to describe them. He does it in the next chapter. There we get a list of what may be called the instances of Adhibhūta, Adhyatma and Adhideva. No attempt has been made to define them. We have, therefore, to do it ourselves.

There are two points to be noted carefully. The first is that these terms imply one another and are inseparably connected in respect of their meaning. To take one example, it is said that the visual-sense is Adhyatma, Rūpa or

colour is its Adhibhūta, and its Adhideva is the Sun. Similarly, Vak is Adhyatma, that which is spoken is its Adhibhuta, and Agni is its Adhideva. It seems thus that function or Karāṇa is Adhyatma, the object or Kārya is Adhibhūta and Adhideva is the unity or the principle that underlies and transcends both.

These terms thus represent a scheme of viewing Reality. The outline of this scheme agrees wonderfully with that of Sāṃkhya. Only the thirteen Karāṇas, recognised by Sāṃkhya, are mentioned in this list. Each of them is Adhyatma. Their objects are Adhibhūtas. The philosophy of Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, however, does not recognise all Adhidevas mentioned in the Mahābhārata list. Karāṇas and their functioning involve only one Adhideva and that is Jñā or Puruṣa. It is the principle of unity that underlies all functioning.

This brings us to the second point. It is the ultimate rejection of the mythological gods like Indra, Agni as independent principles of individual functions. We are told that Buddhi is Adhideva of Ahankāra and Atman is Adhideva of Buddhi. This is very significant and marks what may be called the transition from the mythological to the rational. In Sāṃkhya-Kārikā we do not find, for this reason, many Adhidevas but only one which is not Ātman but Jñā or Puruṣa.

The philosophy of Sāṃkhya-Kārikā may, therefore, be said to signify, by Ādhibhautika, Ādhidaivika and Ādhyatmika Bandhas, the erroneous views regarding the scheme of Adhideva-Adhyatma-Adhibhūta. It is possible to fill in this scheme in many ways. It may be God-man-world or Brahma-Māyā-Jagat or even Matter-energy-world. Sāṃkhya rejects all these and proposes what may be described as the unity of Jñā (Logical Principle)-Avyakta (psychological medium)-Vyakta. This is the Sāṃkhya scheme of the structure of Reality.

The account of three Bandhas, viz. Prākṛtika, Vaikṛtika

and Dakṣinaka points to the same conclusion. They refer to the ignorance of the true nature of Prakṛti, Prakṛtivikṛti, and Puruṣa or Jñāna. In short, Bandhas signify erroneous views of Reality. They are three, simply because Reality is a triune-unity of Adhideva-Adhyatma-Adhibhūta.

The terms Prakṛtika etc. must have been coined later when Duḥkha was added to Bandha.

The right perspective, according to Sāṃkhya, is the point of view of Jñāna or the logical point of view. Insistence on this means the rejection of the naturalistic, theistic and psychological or subjectivistic points of view.

Thus emerges, from the discussion of Bandhas, the conception of philosophy as the theory or Vidyā or knowledge of Reality as subject-object or Vyaktavaktajña. This shows how worthless the traditional interpretation of Duḥkhatraya is. Not only that. It is positively misleading, for, it creates the impression that the Sāṃkhya philosophy arose directly out of popular beliefs and vulgar superstitions and was absolutely without any philosophical background. But an advanced system like Sāṃkhya, which takes a distinctive point of view of great philosophical value, could never have been conceived, far less propounded, in an environment of popular superstitions and pessimistic hysterics.

Sāṃkhya is primarily, as says Croce¹, an exposition of a gnoseologically conceived Logic. It, therefore, could not omit the discussion of errors. Croce himself says that these errors are Scepticism, Mysticism, Dualism, Ästheticism etc. According to Sāṃkhya, they are Naturalism, Theism or Polytheism, Psychologism or Mysticism or the various erroneous ways of filling in the scheme of Adhideva-Adhyatma-Adhibhūta.

The first line of the first Kārikā, therefore, means that the enquiry called the Sāṃkhya philosophy is inspired by the object of dispelling the various errors

1. Ency. of Phil. Sciences Vol. 1, Logic P. 213.

regarding Reality. Sāṃkhya, however, does not and cannot stop here. Being pledged to the logical point of view, it must denounce Ānuśravika or the ritualistic cult and this it does in the 1st line of the 2nd Karikā. The 2nd line of this Karikā says that Bandhavighata is possible only by knowledge or Vijñāna which is the reverse of ritualism. It is further stated that Ānuśravika is like Drṣṭa or the obvious ways. But what are these obvious ways ? Our hypothesis is that occultism and ascetic practices are meant by the obvious ways. The arguments in support of this hypothesis are derived from (1) the account of Siddhis which do not lend any countenance to these practices and (2) from the logical position of Sāṃkhya which demands the rejection of all theories and practices that do not recognise the fundamental and supreme value of knowledge and the moral or social functions. Sāṃkhya-Yoga is the product of an uncritical alliance. The view-points of the two are not only different but opposed. Yoga is theistic while Sāṃkhya, as we have seen, treats Theism as Bandha or error. They are also culturally differentiated.

This philosophy is in perfect agreement with that trend of the Upaniṣadic thought, according to which, Reality is Jñānasvarūpa or identical with Knowledge. But its theory of Knowledge or Reality marks it off from Nyāya, Vedānta and almost every other system of thought except Buddhism and Jainism and brings it into closer touch with the theory of Puruṣa which Yāgñavalkya has propounded in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (Ch. IV. 3rd Brahman). It does not believe in Knowledge as such or Jñānamatra which cancels even the distinction between the knower and the known. On the other hand, it definitely holds that knowledge is a unity in continuity, Sarga or construction. Knowing is neither copying a ready-made objective world nor refusing to think of it but constructing the objective. The objective is the objectification of Meaning or Puruṣartha-prakāśa. Jñāna is not mere Being but the Being that Means.

Some Indian philosophers have tried to arrange the six systems of Indian thought in a hierarchical scale with Vedanta at the top. Sāṃkhya is treated as the second best. Sāṃkhya, however, emphatically protests against any such subordination. It propounds a unique philosophy and any attempt to subordinate it to Vedanta betrays a complete misunderstanding of its principles.

European writers are generally of opinion that Indian thought is religious and not philosophical. Indian philosophy has, for this reason, been denied a place in the History of Philosophy. They must note very carefully that Sāṃkhya is at least an exception. It has proclaimed in no uncertain voice that true philosophy is the knowledge of what Knowledge or Reality is. Even the charge of pessimism does not stand against it. It draws its inspiration not from the experience of Duḥkha but from the inherent Jīvāśa of Reason. Macdonell¹ has, of course, acclaimed it as the first rationalistic philosophy of the world. But the depth of that rationalism has yet to be fathomed.

We shall close this chapter by drawing pointed attention to the fact that the point of view of Sāṃkhya is logical and not psychological. Confusion between these two points of view has been the stumbling-block of many a system of thought. It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish the two very clearly. With this end in view, we shall quote a very significant passage from Bosanquet's Essentials of Logic. It runs thus : "In the one sense my mind is in my head, in the other sense my head is in my mind. In the one sense I am in space, in the other sense space is in me." The former signifies the psychological, while the latter the logical point of view. The following pages will show how Sāṃkhya has, in every detail, consistently carried out the demands of this logical outlook and how the false Sāṃkhya has been victimised by the psychological.

CHAPTER II.

The Theory of Causation.

The problem of causation must figure prominently in a demonstrative theory of Reality and Sāṃkhya has given it the due share of importance. The theory of causation has been propounded in the ninth Kārikā. It would, however, be a mistake to suppose—and this is usually forgotten—that all that Sāṃkhya has to say about causation is contained only in that Kārikā. The full significance, again, of this very important Kārikā can be realised only when it is read in the context of the entire Sāṃkhya philosophy.

The ninth Kārikā is meant for establishing the peculiar Sāṃkhya theory of causation called Satkāryavāda. It states a conclusion supported by arguments. The conclusion is Sat Kāryam. According to Vacaspati, it means that the effect pre-exists in the cause. This interpretation, we contend, is doubly objectionable. In the first place, it suggests that the cause may exist without effecting. In the second place, it states only half the truth and may be said to have suppressed the most important significance of the theory of Satkāryavāda. Students of Sāṃkhya are well aware of the manner in which the former has been exploited to bring in the theory of Pralaya (wholesale withdrawal) and the consequent Ārambha (initiation) of the unfoldment of Avyakta. It has not unfortunately been realised that Pralaya and Ārambha sound the death-knell of the theory of Satkāryavāda which means that causation (and, therefore, the cause and the effect) is real as distinguished from illusory projection or creation of ignorance. Kāryam is Sat as a matter of principle and has nothing to do with the ignorance or error of the individual Puruṣa.

The peculiar point of the Sāṃkhya theory of causation

is that causation is disimplication. The cause is the implicit effect and the effect is the explicit cause. In other words, causality means a *process*. It is a beginningless and endless process of continuous unfoldment. This process is never only cause or only effect but ever cause-effect or, as Sāṃkhya would say, Vyaktavyakta. As cause it is Avyakta. As effect it is Vyakta. Vyaktavyakta is a dynamic order, a systematic Nimittanaimittikaprasaṅga or causal process.

The causal process is necessarily an objective process. The cause is an object. The effect is also an object. Sāṃkhya has, therefore, told us that Vyaktavyakta is Viṣaya or objective. As such, the category of causality carries with it the categories of time and space. The causal process has an inseparable time-space-character. The terms Kāraṇa (cause) and Kārya (effect) have a restricted application in Sāṃkhya. It will not certainly do to forget it, as is usually done. It must be remembered that Reality, according to Sāṃkhya, is not Vyaktavyakta only but Vyaktavyaktajñā. The term Jñā has a very important meaning. We shall see below what that meaning is.

We have said that Satkaryavāda signifies (i) that causality is a process and (ii) that the causal process is real. We shall now turn to the ninth Karika and see how far it goes with us. It should be remembered, however, that the distinction between the cause and the effect is a necessary logical distinction and applies to the objective continuum. They are the two distinguishable moments of the objective process. If one of them be real, the other must also be real. The question now is : What is exactly the relation between the two distinguishable moments called the cause and the effect ?

Vācaspati says that, according to Sāṃkhya, cause and effect are non-different. This is again a partial truth. The relation of cause to effect is, according to Sāṃkhya, one of identity-in-difference. Our contention is proved

by the fact that the eighth Karika states quite clearly that the effect of Prakṛti is Prakṛtivirūpam Sarūpam Ca i. e. like Prakṛti in some respects and unlike it in others. Karikas 10 and 11 again state the features in which Vyakta (the effect) and Avyakta (the cause) agree and differ. It would be more proper, therefore, to say that the relation of cause to effect is not one of non-difference but one of identity-in-difference.

The argument Kāraṇabhbavat means that the nature of the effect must be conceived as determined by the nature of the cause. In other words, there must be identity of content between the cause and the effect. Without this identity of content the causal relation is absolutely meaningless. But why should it be so ? Saṃkhyā gives the reply in the other argument, *viz.* Saktasya Śakya-karaṇat. It means that the cause and the effect must be conceived as adequate (both qualitatively and quantitatively) to each other.

But why should they be adequate to each other ? The reply is given in the argument, *viz.* Sarvasambhavābhavat. It means that it is inconceivable that any means can contribute to any effect. The denial of the condition of adequacy would lead to the position that any means can account for any effect. Such a position, as is well-known, undermines the very foundation of knowledge. Saṃkhyā, however, is prepared to give the opponent the fairest possible considerations. The opponent is perfectly at liberty to question the necessity of the employment of means for effectuation. The reply to such a question is given in the argument, *viz.* Upādā-nagrahaṇat. It means that the employment of means is a necessary condition of all intelligible effectuation. It need not be pointed out that Saṃkhyā is not at all concerned with magic or miracle. Saṃkhyā does not even stop here. It allows the question : Cannot the means that is necessary for effectuation be Non-being or Asat ?

The reply is evidently in the negative and is given in the argument, *viz.* Asadakaraṇat *i.e.* Non-being cannot be Karana. In other words, the cause and the effect cannot be different in kind. There can only be formal differences owing to the effect being the *explicit* cause.

The ninth Karika thus refers to certain inconceivabilities in support of the conclusion, *viz.* Satkāryam. It is inconceivable that the non-existent can be a means *i.e.* the existent, that there can be effectuation without the employment of means and that any means can contribute to any effect. On the other hand, it is necessary to hold that the means must be adequate, qualitatively and quantitatively, to the effect and thus the cause must be taken as determining the nature of the effect. The cause being thus positive, the effect must be taken as Sat or real (as the disimplication of the cause).

The relation of cause to effect being thus one of disimplication, cause-effect must mean a continuous process. As both the factors of this process are real, the process itself is real. Satkāryam, therefore, means that the causal-objective process is a real process.

We get this very conclusion from another side as well. In Sāṃkhya, Karyam means effect and also the ever-evolving order of Matāpitṛja and Prabhūta Viśeṣas or the Pañcabhautika order. Vyakta is another name for this order. According to Sāṃkhya, Vyakta is real. Its cause Avyakta is also real. Thus we find that Satkāryam means that the Pañcabhautika causal-objective order is real. It should be noted here that Sāṃkhya is not bound down by the conception that the real must be unchanging and unchangeable. According to Sāṃkhya, even change is real provided it is systematic.

The Sāṃkhya theory of causation is thus exactly what the logical outlook demands. In the domain of the objective there is the iron rule of necessity or predetermination. The world-process is, in every detail, causally determined.

Cause is the system of conditions that is continuous through the effect.

In the theory of Satkaryavada Sāṃkhya has explained the nature of the causal-objective process or Vyaktavyakta. But this is not all that can be said about it. The most important aspect still remains to be propounded. The causal process has to be viewed in relation to Thought or Meaning. When that is done, the insufficiency of the category of causality becomes obvious. Causality requires to be transcended by Reason and the Law of causation by the Law of Sufficient Reason.

Sāṃkhya is alive to all these necessities and has recorded its view in wonderfully exact terminology. In the first place, Avyakta has been called Karana or the cause of Vyakta but Puruṣa or Jñāna has been called the Adhiṣṭhāna or ground of Vyaktavyakta (K. 17). Karana has been distinguished from Adhiṣṭhāna, cause from Reason. This is the limitation of the category of causality in Sāṃkhya. Reason is the sufficient reason of everything. The causal process is, therefore, Puruṣarthahetuka i.e. dependent on what Puruṣa means (K. 42). Artha does not mean purpose as the false Sāṃkhya understands it. Jñāna, the synthetic principle of Meaning, is the fundamental ground of the systematic construction that the objective is. Reality is, therefore, Knowledge or the objectification of Meaning or the continuous construction of the objective.

Sarga or this constructive process has thus two aspects, viz. the aspect of Meaning or Bhāvakhya and the aspect of objective symbolism or Lingākhya (K. 52). Not only that. The same Karikā tells us that there is no Linga without Bhāva and no realisation (Nirvṛtti not Nivṛtti) of Bhāva without Linga. In other words, Meaning without symbol and symbol without Meaning are both abstractions and unreal.

We find, therefore, that the real world-process is an eternal symbolisation of Meaning. Looked at from one

point of view, it is a naturalistic mechanical process. From another point of view, it is shot through with Meaning and is hence logical or ideal. From the right point of view, it is the *realisation* of "Idea."

Sāmkhya recognises three aspects of Reality. They may be arranged in the following order of logical consequence:—

Jñā	Artha	Meaning
Avyakta	Pravṛtti (Kaivalyārtham)	Individualising* causality
Vyakta	Kriyā (Parispandalakṣaṇa)	Additive* causality.

The higher in the scale implies the lower and the lower presupposes the higher. Hence Reality is a process of systematic disimplication or Vyaktavyaktajñā or Knowledge.

The Sāmkhya theory of causation, as outlined above, proves unquestionably that our contention is legitimate. Sāmkhya is a logical theory of Reality and is neither theistic nor dualistic nor naturalistic. The false Sāmkhya, for reasons and motives which will be shown later on, changed it fundamentally by interpreting Puruṣartha teleologically instead of logically. We know that purpose presupposes Reason. The original Sāmkhya knew it too. But later Sāmkhya stumbled here.

Along with purpose comes the concept of Pralaya for purpose must be fulfilled some day. When it is fulfilled, there is no reason why the whole machinery involved in the achievement of the end should persist any longer. So we find that Sarga or construction arrives at a stage when it is no longer necessary (K. 66). But a purpose that emerges in time and retires in time cannot be fundamental. It requires to be explained. In other words, it must have sufficient reason. It is certainly no explanation to say that somehow Puruṣa errs into a fasci-

* Driesch. The History and Theory of Vitalism.

nation for Prakṛti and Prakṛti, for the sake of Puruṣa, shows herself in her true colour and thereby helps Puruṣa to free himself from the self-imposed bondage. The original Saṃkhyā attained a much superior level and was far removed from this sort of childish speculation. It realised full well that all this, *viz.* the possibility of falling into error, the erroneous construction of the world and the dissolution of the world with the cessation of error and the emergence of knowledge, even if true, necessarily presupposes a wider system without which this sort of systematic (?) error cannot be explained.

That the original Saṃkhyā meant by Artha primarily Meaning will be evident from Kārikā 36, the structure of Liṅga and last, but not the least, the use of the word Jñā in Vyaktavyaktajñā. It does recognise purpose but that only as the derivative of Reason which is treated as fundamental.

It is easy now to see where Saṃkhyā differs from other systems of Indian thought. It does not recognise any Avidyā or Māya or Vāsanā as the cause of the world. It does not hold that the world-sense is an offspring of ignorance. On the contrary, it definitely asserts that to be a world is the very essence of Puruṣartha or Reason or Meaning. The essence of Jñā is, in the words of Green, "in the objective order of things". Avyakta or better Vyaktavyakta is real, for Jñā means it.

Our interpretation has got to face two problems of first-rate importance. One concerns the account of evolution attributed to the Saṃkhyā philosophy. The other is the theory of Mokṣa. The second problem will be fully discussed afterwards. For the present, however, we shall mention the very significant fact that the term Mokṣa is conspicuous by its absence in the first 52 Kārikās. Only once in Kārikā 44 the term Apavarga has been used. It need not, however, mean Mokṣa of the type indicated in the later Kārikās.

As regards the problem of evolution, we maintain that the texts do not justify the supposition that Avyakta begins to evolve at a certain point of time and gradually by unfoldment becomes the concrete Vyakta, as an aggregate of separable elements. Saṁkhya, on the other-hand, holds that the objective is an eternal and ever-evolving concrete continuum. It is a systematic construction. Consequently, it has a definite and perfectly intelligible structure. The categories are the inseparable components of this structure, arranged in the order of logical presupposition and implication. Later Saṁkhya has committed the fallacy of taking logical analysis for temporal or physical evolution.

To sum up, the discussion of Bandhas has led us to the conclusion that the point of view of Saṁkhya is logical. The theory of causation confirms this conclusion and further shows that, according to Saṁkhya, Reality is not mere Being nor mere Change but systematic Change or unity in continuity or objectifying Meaning. The principle of Meaning is fundamental and absolute. Thought is connected Meaning or System. The fundamental Law of Thought is the Law of Sufficient Reason and not the Law of mere Identity or of Non-contradiction.

CHAPTER III

The Theory of Pramāṇa.

The Saṃkhyā theory of Pramāṇa further confirms our contention that it is a logical theory of Reality. We are told that Prameyasiddhi or the ascertainment of truth or fact is always a matter of proof. Saṃkhyā thus refuses to accept as true anything that is not capable of being proved. Rational comprehension or deduction is thus an absolute necessity. (K. 4.)

Proof or Pramāṇa is defined as that which leads to Pramāṇa or cognition of truth. This definition, however, is obviously inadequate, for the central concept of Pramāṇa has been left undefined. The question, therefore, is : What is the meaning of Pramāṇa ? The answer that it is right knowledge and consists in the conformity of ideas to objects is obviously defective. What is more, however, is that Saṃkhyā definitely rejects such a theory. The objective as Vyakta presupposes Avyakta and the objective as Avyakta presupposes Jñāna or Puruṣārtha. Consequently, the objective cannot be said to have any priority in knowledge. Knowing in Saṃkhyā is not copying a ready-made objective, and truth cannot, therefore, consist in the conformity of ideas to objects or of the copy to the original.

The objective is a Pratyayasarga i.e. a logical construction. Pratyaya has the sense of predication and Sarga means unfoldment or construction. Pratyayasarga means, therefore, enlargement or unfoldment by predication or affirmation or judgment. It is always a disimplication of a relatively undifferentiated presented datum and hence Anadhigata or characterised by real reference. It is further Aviparita i.e. necessary, and

hence realised as Asandigdha i.e. universal or true, not for one but for all. Pramā is, therefore, knowledge characterised by objectivity, necessity and universality. Pramāṇas may now be defined as the modes by which the necessary and universal objective order is constructed. They are the ways of the rational construction and comprehension of reality.

That our definition of Pramāṇa is true to the spirit of the Saṃkhyā philosophy is further proved by the exclusion of Upamāna, Artha-patti, Sambhava etc. Saṃkhyā cannot recognise them as Pramāṇas, for they all mean hypothetical construction as distinguished from deduction or demonstrative construction or Pramā.

The rejection of Anupalabdhī is also very significant. It means the rejection of Abhāva as a separate Prameya. Abhāva is negation and as such is significant only as an element in an affirmation. In other words, Abhāva must be treated as resting on Bhāva or affirmation. The reason is that as knowledge is necessarily characterised by real or objective reference, there cannot be any knowledge of the negation of objectivity or, what is the same thing, the negation of objectivity necessarily presupposes the objective. In other words, it means that Puruṣartha necessarily means the objective order, and world-sense is the very essence of Jñāna. It is, therefore, a mischievous distortion of truth to say that wisdom means the absolute negation of Avyakta or Vyakta, or that true knowledge is an objectless Caitanya-mātra. It may be true of any other philosophy but to foist it into Saṃkhyā is nothing short of either intellectual obtuseness or dishonesty.

Vacaspati has tried to show that other Pramāṇas are included in the three recognised by Saṃkhyā. The truth, however, is that they are involved in knowledge. They by themselves are incapable of definite construction of reality. But they may be involved in it, as for example, hypothesis is not demonstration, though it

may be involved in demonstration. But when demonstrated, it is no longer hypothesis. So long as it is not demonstrated, it is not Pramāṇa or knowledge.

Sāṃkhya thus recognises three kinds of Pramāṇas or modes of the construction of reality. They are Dṛṣṭa or perception, Anumāna or inference (as distinguished from mere hypothesis) and Āptavacana or Āptaśruti. In his account of the Pramāṇas Vacaspati has been totally misled by the Nyāya phenomenology of knowledge which is as much like the Sāṃkhya theory of knowledge as Mill's logic is like that of Bosanquet. Indeed, there are fundamental differences and it would be our endeavour to understand them clearly.

A. Perception.

It has been defined as Prativiṣayādhyavasaya. Prati-
viṣaya means referring to the objective or objective reference. Adhyavasaya has been defined by Vacaspati as knowledge due to the exercise of Buddhi. So far it is all right. But he commits a fatal blunder when he says that this exercise of Buddhi is the effect of the proximity of sense-organs to sense-objects. Here he throws overboard the logical position of Sāṃkhya and introduces the commonsense Realism of Nyāya. Logically, the object cannot be prior to Adhyavasaya and Sāṃkhya has no misgivings on this point. The 96th Karikā has stated clearly that the function of the Karaṇas is to manifest the meaning of Puruṣa and then to present it to Buddhi. It means that meaning or positing logically precedes the presenting. The term Adhyavasaya thus means meaning or intending or positing and presenting the objective as a world. Perceiving is thus "not an effect of the Ego on the non-Ego or of the non-Ego on the Ego." It is a unique act of meaning and presenting the objective as a whole or a world (Kṛtsnam).

Perception is, according to Sāṃkhya, not only positing and presenting a world but also constructing de-

finite objects in it. It involves the activity of attention or *Manas* (*Sankalpa*) which enlarges the undifferentiated data into judgments of identity, as for example, this is a rose. The percept is thus an object or judgment realised as existing in a world. Perceptive judgment is constructive of the individual as an identity-in-difference or an instance of a kind, and not a particular as such. It is a mistake to say that perception is concerned with particulars. There is no particular in knowledge. The unit of knowledge is a judgment or an object as an individual or an instance of a kind. Hence *Karika* 6 states “*Sāmānyataḥ tu dṛṣṭat*”, i.e. perception is the cognition of objects as identities or instances of a kind. *Vacaspati* has completely misunderstood this point.

B. Inference.

The *Karikas* have given a very meagre account of inference. We have been told only (1) that it is concerned with *Linga-līgi* relation and (2) that there are three distinguishable varieties of inference. Commentators tell us that the three varieties are *Pūrvavat*, *Seśavat* and *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. *Vacaspati* has, of course, given a detailed exposition of the three types of inference. But we have our reasons to fear his gifts, simply because he is so obsessed with the *Nyāya* theory of inference.

Linga-līgi relation means the relation of sign and signification, or meaning and symbol. It is a connection of meaning or logical connection. Of this two varieties may be noticed. They are (1) the causal relation and (2) the relation of kind and instance or *Sāmānya* and *Viśeṣa*.

Inference may thus be defined as the systematic construction or explanation of the objective world of perception by the disimplication of the connection of meaning hidden from sense-perception. It is distinguishable but not separable from perception. Perception and inference are continuous. The function of inference is

to ascertain the supersensible in the sensible and to exhibit the world of perception as an intelligible system of correlated parts. We fail to understand what Vācaspati means by saying that Saṃyatodṛṣṭa inference alone is concerned with the supersensible. Does he mean that Pūrvavat and Saṃyatodṛṣṭa inferences have nothing to do with the logical relation of Liṅga-lingi or does he mean that this relation is sensible? Does he mean, in other words, that perceiving fire and smoke is the same thing as knowing that one is the cause of the other? These are simply absurd propositions. Consequently, we hold that inference of every description is concerned with the ascertainment of the supersensible in the sensible and thereby making perceptual knowledge intelligible.

Now, the basis of a classification of inferences must be the peculiarities of method. Hence it is reasonable to think that Pūrvavat, Saṃyatodṛṣṭa and Saṃyatodṛṣṭa inferences differ in respect of method. It is no distinction to say that Saṃyatodṛṣṭa inference is concerned with the supersensible while Pūrvavat is concerned with the sensible. If they be different, they must differ as methods. The problem, therefore, is to determine what the different methods are and wherein they differ.

It is said that Pūrvavat and Saṃyatodṛṣṭa inferences are based on causal relation while Saṃyatodṛṣṭa is based on the cognition of Saṃanya i. e. the identity or the kind or the universal.

Pūrvavat and Saṃyatodṛṣṭa. They have been interpreted in two ways. According to one interpretation, Saṃyatodṛṣṭa means an inference from the effect to the cause, as of rain from rise in the river. Pūrvavat means inference from the cause to the effect, as of rain from the gathering of the clouds. In this sense, however, both of them are methodically identical. They are deductions from a causal generalisation (implicit or explicit).

According to the other interpretation, Sesavat means concerning the remainder or the residue. The illustration given is : Sound is either substance, or quality, or action. It is neither substance nor action ; therefore, it is a quality. It is a disjunctive reasoning in which one alternative is affirmed by eliminating other possible alternatives. This is also the method of what European logicians call inductive proof. Sesavat inference is, therefore, inference by elimination of alternative possibilities.

Purvavat, on the other hand, means 'as before.' The illustration given is : If smoke is, fire is. There is smoke ; therefore, there is fire. Here the law of smoke has been extended to an *instance* of smoke. This is the type of what European logicians call mixed hypothetical reasoning. The way in which the two inferences have been distinguished shows clearly that the Indian logicians did not fall a prey to the errors of (1) treating induction and deduction as antagonistic or (2) treating inference as either consisting in a passage from particular to particular or from the enumeration of particulars to a generalisation. On the contrary, inference is viewed as moving within system. It is systematisation based on systematic knowledge.

Samanyatodrsta. It is said to be "an inference based on the perception of species or class". It is intimately connected with Dr̥ṣṭa as Samanyaataḥ. It is an inference based on the cognition of identity between otherwise different things. It involves a passage from an observed identity to a relevant but unobserved identity. It is, therefore, said to resemble that which is known in European logic as analogy.

It may be illustrated thus :—

* Holding is 'an action and involves the use of the hand or an instrument.

Seeing is an action ; therefore, it also involves the use of an instrument, e.g. the visual sense.

Symbolically,

A is X and R.

B is X ; therefore, B is also R.

Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, however, differs from analogy in very important respects. In analogy the conclusion, B is R, is hypothetical. It is based on the *supposed* relevancy between X and R. Again, X is a point of resemblance or Sādṛśya. In Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, on the other hand, relevancy of X to R is *known*. Again, X is the point of identity or Samanya as distinguished from mere Sādṛśya. The conclusion in this case is not hypothetical but possesses demonstrative certainty. In other words, it is a variety of Prama.

In Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference, therefore, there is a passage from A is R to B is R on the strength of the cognition of identity of A and B in respect of X and the connection of meaning between X and R. In other words, it is the deductive or syllogistic reasoning of the categorical type and is concerned with the construction of wider systems by extending the range of established definitions to otherwise different spheres on the basis of relevant identity. Pārvatī inference involves a passage from law to a *repeated* instance of the law while Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa involves a unification of spheres otherwise different from one another. Dṛṣṭa as Sāmānyataḥ is the fundamental ground of all inferential constructions, because inference is always made possible by the cognition of an identity. The peculiar function of Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference is to find an identity and thereby ensure the application of a definition or principle. It thus gives the minor premise its due importance.

We conclude, therefore, that inference is constructive of reality as systematic meaning and that perception and inference are not separable but distinguishable moments of logical construction. The logical necessity, implicit in perceptual construction, becomes explicit in the inferential which is, therefore, the life and soul of science. The

objective of perception and inference is thus the world that we are obliged to think.

C. Āptavacana.

This term is understood to mean Sruti or superrational revelation as contained in the Jñāna-kānda of the Vedas. The recognition of this Pramāṇa has created a great difficulty, simply because Rationalism and Faith in revelation are not obviously consistent and leads to the dualism of Reason and Faith.

Some have tried to obviate the difficulty by suggesting that the recognition of Āptavacana on the part of the Sāṃkhya philosophy was a matter of policy. Others have tried to get out of it by asserting that the rationality of Sruti is inherent in it. But the former is an undeserved condemnation and the latter is a dogmatic statement.

There is a third way open, *viz.* questioning the correctness of the usual interpretation of Āptavacana and we have preferred to try it. Now, Āptavacana has been defined as Āptaśruti. Sruti and Śabda mean the same thing. In his commentary on the 51st Karika Vacaspati has said that Śabda means the comprehension of the meaning of oral instruction. Āptaśruti, therefore, means comprehension of the meaning of oral instruction and *finding it to be Āpta* or true. Āptavacana, therefore, being Āptaśruti, is not a superrational, privileged and unquestionable body of statements. It is distinguished from blind faith and external authority. Āptavacana as Āptaśruti is a Pramāṇa only when oral instruction has been found to be true *i.e.* has satisfied the conditions of rational comprehension. It is authoritative not because somebody has said it but because it has survived the test of reason. Valid testimony is ultimately the testimony of the person comprehending the meaning of Sruti or the direct testimony of self-consciousness.

Vacaspati has himself supported our contention when he rejects the revelations of Śākyā, Bhikṣu and others as

pretended, on the ground that they make unreasonable assertions and are not amenable to proof. Āptavacana must, therefore, be amenable to proof. This means that Reason is the ultimate foundation of truth. The recognition of Āptavacana is thus not in the least inconsistent with the logical point of view of Saṃkhya.

Now, comprehension of meaning can not come as a gift from another. It is always one's own construction and may be said to be self-realisation or self-construction. A student, for example, must construct in his own mind the professor's meaning. So long as he does not do it he merely crams and cannot be said to *understand*. Even understanding is not enough. It must be found to be amenable to proof. Āptaśruti, therefore, is at once personal (as one's own realisation) and superpersonal (as a necessity of thought or a demand of reason). Thus Āptavacana is self-realisation and self-transcendence. It is the act of rational comprehension on the part of each enquirer. The recognition of Āptavacana does not, therefore, amount to the acceptance of any authority outside Reason. It amounts ultimately to the comprehension of Puruṣartha or the meaning of Vyaktavyaktajñā and the rational conviction of its truth which every one must realise for himself.

The 6th Kārikā has been interpreted differently by Vacaspati and Gauḍapāda. We have accepted Gauḍapāda's interpretation for reasons that have been stated in the course of the discussion on the nature of inference. It states that sensible objects as individuals are known by perception, the supersensible by inference, and whatever is not amenable to either perception or inference is known by Āptavacana.

This Kārikā does not mean that perception, inference, and Āptavacana construct independent spheres of reality or are independent modes of construction. They are only distinguishable moments, as we have seen, of logical construction or knowledge. As distinguishable they

must have functions peculiar to each. But this need not mean functioning independently of one another.

The recognition of Aptavacana only shows that inference is not the limit of Reason or knowledge. Knowledge means something more than the perceptual and inferential construction of a system of interconnected parts. This system must be finally realised as the objectification of Puruṣartha or rational meaning and hence our meaning and every rational creature's meaning. Its reality has its basis in the direct testimony of self-consciousness and does not derive it from either a suprarational God or Ātman or Brahman or a foreign and alien material stuff. The direct testimony of self-consciousness, however, does not cancel perception and inference but comprehends and permeates them.

It follows, therefore, that according to Sāṃkhya the very essence of Reason is to mean a system of objects and persons. The Sāṃkhya theory of Pramāṇas thus confirms what the theories of Bandha and causation have been found to propound. We shall now turn to the Sāṃkhya conception of the structure of Reality.

CHAPTER IV.

The Structure of Reality.

We have seen that according to Sāmkhya, Reality is knowledge or systematic construction or continuous objectification of Meaning. It is a logical and, therefore, real and eternal process. Such questions as, What was in the beginning ? and What would be in the end ? do not, therefore, arise. The supposition of a beginning and the anticipation of an end are illogical. It may be said that such a reality as is a beginning-less and endless process is inconceivable. But it is not so ; for the process is systematic, has an intelligible structure and is realised as real in the direct testimony of self-consciousness.

This structure has been described, in the first place, as Vyaktavyaktajña. Vācaspati has completely missed the significance of this term. Reality being knowledge, it involves the subject *i.e.* Jñāa constructing or unfolding the objective. The objective, therefore, is Vyaktavyakta *i.e.* the unfoldment of the implicit. Jñāa, Avyakta and Vyakta are the distinguishable moments of Reality. Later Sāmkhya committed a terrible blunder in considering Jñāa and Avyakta as remaining apart but somehow entering into a fanciful but teleological connection and then severing it by knowledge. Vyakta was consequently, treated as Sarga or construction or unfoldment beginning with the fanciful connection of Jñāa and Avyakta and ending with wisdom. According to the original Sāmkhya, however, reality is eternally a Sarga or a construction. Jñāa, Avyakta and Vyakta are eternally involved in this Sarga. Vyakta is real and actual. Jñāa and Avyakta are its logical presuppositions and hence never existing outside it but ever being realised in it. Secondly,

Sarga or the real order has been analysed into 25 principles. They are :—

- (1) Puruṣa distinguished from the rest as neither Prakṛti nor Vīkṛti.
- (2) Prakṛti is the primary datum or Avyakta.
- (3) Seven Prakṛti-vikṛtis, viz. Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra and five Tanmātras.
- (4) Sixteen Vīkṛtis, viz. the eleven Senses and five Bhūtas.

These are the permanent operative principles distinguishable in Sarga or the real order. We shall not try to understand them further at this stage but shall attempt to bring out certain implications of this analysis.

- (1) Puruṣa has here been substituted for Jīva.
- (2) Prakṛti is Avyakta and is implicitly all the rest.
- (3) Vyakta proper has been analysed into seven Prakṛtivikṛtis and sixteen Vīkṛtis.
- (4) It is very significant that the constitution of Vyakta agrees with the constitution of the human individual with his world. The 23 categories, viz. Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra, Manas and the ten Senses on the one hand, and Tanmātras, Bhūtas and their compounds on the other, give us, in outline, the human being with the world which he knows, and in which he lives, moves and has his being. The presence of knowing in man, however, leads him to set himself off, as knower, against the whole world including his own body. The body and the world are realised as evolving in his knowledge. But evolution in knowledge is only disimplication. Hence the objective of knowledge means the disimplication of the implicit. Thus we get in addition to the 23 categories, those of Puruṣa and Avyakta.

This identification of Man with Reality has been claimed by Professor Carlo Formichi¹ as the dynamic

1. See Vis'va-Bharati Quarterly Jany. 1926.

element in Indian religious development. Such an outlook, however, claims to be highly philosophical and it is strange that the learned professor has yet talked of Indian religious (?), instead of, philosophical development. However that be, it reminds us of the instruction of Prajapati¹ to Indra and Virocana, that Reality is nothing more than the image we see in the eye, in water or in a mirror. Well, Prajapati was not deluding² Indra and Virocana but conveying to them the most fundamental truth that Indra or Virocana must be real before anything else can be real.

We are human beings and to us Man must be real before anything else can be real. The problem of philosophy is really to know this Man, to understand what it is. Various solutions of this problem have been offered. The Indian mystic has given one solution in his theory of waking, dream, deep sleep and ecstatic consciousness. The Buddhist has given another in his theory of Skandhas. Sāmkhya says that Man is a whole or a unity in continuity in which 25 categories of varying logical importance may be distinguished.

There are, of course, many men. Sāmkhya does not deny this plurality. Such a denial would be inconsistent with its point of view. But it regards each man as an instance of Subject-object or unity in continuity. We shall call this instance, the man-world. It follows, therefore, and this is the distinctive feature of the Sāmkhya philosophy, that there are as many worlds as there are men. The term Vyakta means in the Sāmkhya philosophy such a man-world or an individualised instance of Subject-object. The man-worlds are numerically many but logically one for they correspond in respect of structure, inspite of differences in detail. This logical unity is Jñāna. The components of the structure of

1. Chāndogya Upanisad.

2. Ranade, Constrictive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy, p. 265.

this man-world are the 25 (more properly 26) categories mentioned above. They are not to be taken as isolated principles but as connected aspects of a whole. They are the universal elements of the structure of Reality, always existing as components of the man-worlds and never existing apart from such a synthesis.

That Vyaktas are not aggregates of parts but synthetic wholes will be evident from their structure. It has, of course, been stated in the 22nd and 24th Kārikās that Mahat comes from Prakṛti, Ahaṅkāra from Mahat etc. It does not mean, however, chronological succession but logical presupposition and implication. We shall explain these points fully in the chapter on the structure of Linga.

Reality is, therefore, a world of man-worlds. It is a system of which every unit is a system. The unit is a man-world or a Vyākta or an instance of Subject-object. It is thus Linga or symbolic of the typical Reality or Subject-object or Jñā-Avyakta. The Linga is Puruṣavyakta, the type is Jñā-Avyakta. The type always exists in its identity in the symbols or Lingas. Hence Puruṣas or Lingas are many yet Jñā-Avyakta is one. (*cf.* the metaphor of the circular panorama given by Bosanquet in his Essentials of Logic p. 14.)

We have distinguished between Jñā and Puruṣa and we maintain that this distinction is very important and is perfectly justified by the texts of the Kārikās. The term Jñā occurs only once in the second Kārika and then recedes into the background making room for the term Puruṣa or Puman. What is important, however, is not that it has occurred only once but that it has occurred once at least. (See chapter VIII). We shall see later on reasons for holding that the 26th category said to be recognised by Saṃkhya is Jñā and not God.

The method of Saṃkhya is perfectly logical and rational. The Kārikās have, of course, proceeded from the

conclusion to the premisses from explanation to the facts explained. But there are evidences in the Karikas themselves to prove that the starting point of Saṃkhya is every-day experience, that its philosophy is a systematic explanation or interpretation of experience and that it is not a revealed doctrine.

The least knowledge of the world exhibits it as a huge space in which two kinds of bodies are noticeable. They are the living creatures and the non-living things or, as Saṃkhya says, Matapitṛja and Prabhūta Viśeṣas. They are physical or, as Saṃkhya would say, specifications of five Bhūtas. They are Viśeṣas *i. e.* not aggregates but specifications. These bodies have a history. Individually, they originate and decompose or disintegrate.

The origination and dissolution of these bodies, however, presuppose systematic functioning or a dynamic objective order. The objective order, functioning according to definite and necessary laws and made up of five Bhūtas, is the necessary presupposition of the origin, existence and dissolution of living and non-living bodies.

This objective order is, however, not ultimate. The Biologist tries to explain the whole of the living creature with reference to this order or environment. The Natural Scientist tries to explain this environment with the living bodies with reference to the physical laws of aggregation and separation of the elements or elemental forces.

Saṃkhya, however, parts company with the Natural Scientist and the Biologist at this point. This objective order is explained with reference to Tanmātras. Tanmātras are not elements. They are, on the one hand, the stuff of the elements and, on the other hand, co-ordinated with the sense-functions.

Yet they are the manifestations of the Ego or *Ahankāra*. Consequently, the introduction of Tanmātras means the introduction of the Ego. The whole Bhautika world is thus transformed into a course of conscious states relative

to the conscious Ego. This Ego is again a course of consciousness for it is also Tanmatrika.

Here, we find ourselves almost in the company of Protagoras, and Subjective Idealism stares us in the face. Sāmkhya, however, proceeds undaunted and argues thus:—The Ego is a course of consciousness. The so-called objective order is also a course of consciousness. The Ego and the objective are, therefore, only differentiations of the undifferentiated course of consciousness or experience or Avyakta.

Avyakta is, however, not a self-presenting, self-constructing and self-comprehending principle which contains its own explanation. Without such a logical principle, again, the fact of the differentiation of Avyakta into the Ego and Tanmātras cannot be explained. Hence there is, as the logical presupposition of Avyakta, the principle of Reason or Meaning or Puruṣartha or Jñā. It is the fundamental self-evident ground or Adhisthāna of Avyakta. It is in virtue of this unique Adhisthāna that Avyakta differentiates into the Ego or Ahaṅkāra on the one hand, and Tanmātras on the other. Really speaking, Avyakta has no existence apart from this ground. While as grounded on it, it is nothing but the undifferentiated experience of Jñā, the Synthetic Principle of Meaning. It is the presentative aspect of Jñā, which is the principle of presentation.

Reality is thus Vyaktavyaktajñā or self-differentiation, self-presentation, self-construction and self-comprehension of Meaning. It is from one point of view a body of bodies or a system of systems and from another point of view a society of persons or Puruṣas, each of which is realised as an instance of Jñā or Subject-object.

This is, in outline, the Sāmkhya analysis of Reality. We shall now proceed to substantiate our account of Reality on the evidence of the Kārikās.

CHAPTER V.

Linga

The traditional interpretation of the Sāmkhya philosophy has departed in many important respects from the meaning of the Kārikās. One of them is the interpretation of the nature of Linga. This concept has been practically thrown into the background and distorted to suit the needs of a peculiar theory of Mokṣa. We shall endeavour in this chapter to restore this concept from the language of the Kārikās.

We find this term for the first time in the 10th Kārikā. It signifies one of the characteristics of Vyakta. According to Vācaspati it means liable to be merged into Avyakta or to be dissolved. (Layam gacchati iti Liṅgam). It is here used as an attributive and not as a substantive name.

In the 20th Kārikā we find the term Liṅga for the second time. Here we are told that Acetana Liṅga becomes like Cetana on account of its contact with Jñā.

Taking the two together we find that Vyakta as Liṅga means something more than mere liability to be dissolved. It is an organism or system and such an organism as can, at least, appear as a conscious individual. This has led us to the conclusion that Vyakta is really Vyakti or man-world. It is an individual person aware of a world of things and persons. We shall see afterwards whether Vyakta or Liṅga is emergent or not. For the present we may be permitted to advance our interpretation for the sake of clearness. This Vyakta person is Liṅga for it is symbolic or an incarnation of Jñā. Thus Jñā is distinguished from Puruṣa or person. Puruṣa is Liṅga and hence has variety and plurality on account of Prasava-dharma of Avyakta. But Jñā is one. Liṅga means symbol. (Liṅganat Jñāpanat Liṅgam). We shall presently refer to

the texts that support our contention that the traditional account of the Sāṃkhya evolution is mistaken in every respect. It has gone absolutely astray. According to the texts of the Kārikās referred to, it will be found that the function of Avyakta is to multiply the instances of Jñā which are Vyaktas or Vyaktis or persons or Puruṣas. The instances symbolise Jñā and hence are called Liṅga.

In the 40th Kārikā we get the definition of Liṅga. But even this will most probably be disputed by Vācaspati. He says that this Kārikā defines Sūkṣma and not Liṅga. The term Liṅga here is taken as an adjective of Sūkṣma (understood). But this interpretation is incorrect. For in the next Kārikā we are told that Liṅga is Nirāśraya without Viśeṣas or specifications. Vācaspati says that Viśeṣas are Sūkṣma Sarīras. Liṅga must then be distinguished from Sūkṣma Viśeṣa. Not only that. It must be taken as substantive and the previous Kārikā must be taken as defining Liṅga, as abstracted from Viśeṣas including Sūkṣma. If the 40th Kārikā were concerned with Sūkṣma and if Liṅga were an adjective of Sūkṣma, there would be no meaning in saying in the 41st Kārikā that Liṅga never exists without Sūkṣma Viśeṣa, for it would mean that Sūkṣma never exists without Sūkṣma. Vācaspati has, therefore, bungled here. This is indeed a very important point and shows clearly how the traditional interpretation has distorted the meaning of these Kārikās.

The 40th Kārikā, therefore, defines Liṅga as abstracted from Viśeṣas. This definition runs thus:—Liṅgam Saṃsarati i.e. persists through changes. It is continuous through its specifications or Viśeṣas. It is a dynamic system or the system in systematic construction that the objective is or the māṇ-worlds are. Its characteristics are:—

(1) Pūrvotpannam i.e. primevally formed. Vācaspati says that it means the first evolute of Prakṛti. So it is indeed, and we have all along been contending for it.

We may say that Linga is what Avyakta means. It is the very essence of Avyakta. Avyakta is Prasavadharmin i.e. multiplies into instances. Each instance is a Liṅga. It is not an aggregate but a whole, as will be seen from its structure. Jñāna is the fundamental type. Liṅga is the symbolised Jñāna and the type of the living individuals. Our interpretation of Kaivalyārtham Pravṛtti is thus supported by the nature of Liṅga. Avyakta is a unity and tends to multiply individuals or unities as symbolic of the ultimate unity, viz. Jñāna.

The term Pūrvotpanna is liable to be misunderstood in one respect. It has been taken to mean generated at some point of time. But it really means the first of the derivative realities in the order of the logical transition from Jñāna to Viśeṣas.

(2) Asakta. It is translated as 'unconfined' Liṅga is called Asakta, says Vācaspati, because it can enter even a solid piece of stone. Gauḍapāda goes further and says that it is Asakta because it is unconfined either in the state of animals or men, or Gods. The correct translation is 'unspecified' but capable of being specified in diverse ways. It is like the Nata or the dramatic actor capable of displaying itself in different roles. (K. 42). It is Asakta because *ex hypothesi* it is without Viśeṣa. It is, not specifically determined. It should be noted that Liṅga is undetermined even in respect of sex.

(3) Niyatam. It persists through the changes and specifications. Now Vācaspati and Gauḍapāda have both tried to explain it away by the qualification "until knowledge is attained." Liṅga is said to be dissolved on the appearance of wisdom. But there is nothing in this Kārikā which justifies this qualification. Nay, there is no passage in the whole body of Kārikās from 1 to 52 which can justify it. On the other hand, there are definite statements to prove

that Niyata means never dissolved but ever persisting. We shall come to it presently.

(4) Linga is a whole of distinguishable aspects. These aspects are Mahat, Ahankara, the eleven Senses and five Tanmatras. That it is a whole and not an aggregate will be evident from its structure. Linga exhibits a stage logically prior to Sukshma. It may be said to be a Guṇa-Viśeṣa. It is the first specification of Avyakta. Vacaspati says that it is endowed with the properties of calmness or restlessness, or dulness. It is certainly false. The 38th Karika says definitely that Bhutas are so characterised and not Tanmatras. But Linga consists of the principles from Mahat to Tanmatras. Bhutas are excluded from the constitution of Linga as conceived here.

(5) Nirupabhogaṁ. This Linga is incapable of experiencing. It cannot fulfil all the conditions of being an experiencer, simply because it is by itself Nirāśraya.

(6) Bhāvaiḥ Adhvīśitam. This is a very important term and has been misinterpreted by all the commentators. Bhavas, they say, are Dharma etc. But it is wholly erroneous. By Bhavas are meant the features of Jña, viz. Sakṣitva, Draṣṭṛtva, Bhoktṛtva, Kaivalya, Mādhyasthya and Akartṛtva. In support of our contention we have to turn to Kārikā 43.

This Karika again has been simply shrouded in myth. Kapila and Vālmiki and their mythical life-history had to be requisitioned, in utter despair, to explain it. This Karika has to be construed in the following way simply because it means to distinguish between Bhavas and Dharma etc. and these two, again, from Kalala etc. Kalala etc. mean the uterine germ etc. and are said to be dependent on Kārya or the body of flesh and blood or the body of five Bhutas born of parents. Dharma etc. are dependent on Karanās, Buddhi, Ahankara etc. They are either Prakṛti-vikṛti or Vikṛti. Dharma etc. are,

therefore, said to be Prākṛtika and Vaikṛtika. Distinguished from both of these are Bhāvas which form the transcendental ground of Dharma etc. These Bhāvas are the features of Jñā stated in Kārikā 19. Dharma etc. are derivative. Bhāvas are fundamental or Sāṃsiddhikāḥ. Jñā is never without Bhāvas. It is a unity of these transcendental characteristics. Bhāvas are innate and one with it.

This further confirms our position that Liṅga is Jñā objectivised in Avyakta. The objective Acetana Liṅga being inspired (Adhivāsita) by Bhāvas is inspired by Jñā. Liṅga is the symbol inspired with Meaning. The term Adhivāsita is highly significant. The point to be noted is that there is no superimposition of Liṅga on Jñā or *vice versa* but the inspiration of Liṅga by Jñā. This is the distinctive feature of the Sāṃkhya philosophy. Liṅga being inspired by Bhāvas of Jñā is invested with the moral properties of Dharma etc. Bhāva or rational meaning is thus the ground of the ethical dispositions.

Liṅga is by itself Acetana and Avivekī but being inspired by Jñā assumes a rational (Cetana) and a moral or purposive (Kartā) character. Is this not a thorough denunciation of the philosophy of the 16 added Kārikās as well as of the traditional interpretation of the Sāṃkhya philosophy? Let scholars reply. There is nothing like Adhyāsa or Māyā. The relation between Jñā and Liṅga has been conceived after the manner of the relation between word and meaning or sign and significance. Sāṃkhya is unique in this respect. But this is not all. There is yet more in the next Kārikā.

In the 41st Kārikā we are told that Liṅga as conceived in the 40th Kārikā is Nirāśraya i.e. supportless or a mere abstraction of thought and never exists without Viśeṣaiḥ. The plural in Viśeṣaiḥ should be noted. 'Niyata' Liṅga tends to be concretised in Viśeṣas. But what are the Viśeṣas recognised by Sāṃkhya? In Kārikā 39 we find

three such specifications. They are Sūkṣma or Tanmātrika specification, Matāpitṛja or the bio-physical or Pāñcabhautika specification and Prabhūta Viśeṣa or the inanimate, Pāñcabhautika object.

Viśeṣah without which Linga never exists are, therefore, Sūkṣma and Matāpitṛja which embody it, and the specifications of Prabhūta type or physical objects like jars, mountains etc. Linga, therefore, always exists as a psycho-physiological system inspired by Jñāna and, therefore, conscious of being a person in a society of persons and aware of a world of things. In other words, Linga with Viśeṣas is identical with Vyakta which is a world of things and persons so organised as to be aware of being a conscious individual or person. There are many persons and as many worlds, for each world is a person but each of them is symbolic of a type and hence they correspond (Bhedānām Samanvayāt). Linga is thus a personal-objective order.

In his commentary on this Kārikā Vacaspati for the first time and for once only takes Lingam to mean a significant symbol (Linganāt jñāpanāt). We contend that this is the real meaning of this term. There is nothing in the first 52 Kārikās to suggest that it means mergent or that there is any such thing as wholesale Pralaya attributed to Sāṃkhya. In fact, there is no reason why there should be such a dissolution of Linga. In the first place, Jñāna does not mean a purposive agent or Kartā but a logical agent, and therefore, Akartā. The final realisation of Meaning is a meaningless thing. Meaning can never be without meaning and what it means is, from one point of view, a system of systems or a world of worlds, and, from another point of view, a society of persons, each aware of this system. So long as Jñāna is there, Avyakta must be there and this would mean Linga and Linga would mean Viśeṣas. Consequently there can not be a wholesale return to Avyakta.

Secondly, the Kārikās are also quite clear on this point. Liṅga has been said to be Nirāśraya without Viśeṣas. This only means that Liṅga must be conceived as existing and tending to exist in the concrete. It does not mean that Liṅga has any tendency to lapse back into Avyakta. It tends towards the concrete and not away from it. Not only that. Liṅga is Niyata and even Sūkṣma is so. But the body of flesh and blood is liable to be dissolved (K. 39). There is dissolution as well as production in the domain of Pāñcabhautika specifications. Consequently we find in the 69th Kārikā that Puruṣartha-jūḍānam is an explanation of the origin, existence, and dissolution of Bhūtas. The word Bhūtānām should be noted. The Sāṃkhya philosophy, which is Puruṣarthajñāna i. e. self-comprehension of Reason, does not talk of the origin and dissolution of Liṅga or Sūkṣma, but of Pāñcabhautika Mātāpīṭṛja bodies and Prabhūta Viśeṣas.

Thirdly, Vācaspati has practically evaded the plural in Viśeṣaiḥ. He takes it to mean Sūkṣmaiḥ. Does it mean that each Liṅga has many Sūkṣma Sariras? It is simply absurd. Consequently, the term Viśeṣaiḥ means all the three Viśeṣas stated in Kārikā 39. Liṅga is therefore, Nirāśraya till it is definitely specified as a living embodied individual aware of a world and born of parents.

We do not propose to enter here into the ethical position of Sāṃkhya as understood by us. It will be fully discussed in a separate chapter. For the present, it may be pointed out that according to Sāṃkhya, as we have shown, Reality is a systematic construction which has two aspects. These are Bhāvakhya and Liṅgakhya. The former inspires the latter. Bhāvakhya is the expression of Bhāvas of Jñāna. Liṅgakhya is the symbolisation of these Bhāvas in the medium of experience or Avyakta.

The 52nd Kārikā not only mentions these two aspects of the systematic construction that Reality is, but says

further that they necessarily and inseparably involve each other.

Saṁkhyā thus recognises that Reality as a whole appears differently from different angles of vision. The physical order (Prabhūta) of Natural science appears in a new light from the biological point of view (Matapitṛja). The biological order is similarly transformed from the psychological (Sūkṣma), the psychological order from the logical-moral (Liṅga) and the latter from the transcendental point of view (Jñā or Bhāvas). Reality is thus a transcendental-rational-moral order realising itself in and through psycho-bio-physical systems. It is an order within orders. The psycho-bio-physical order is objective. Jñā with the Bhāvas is the non-objective transcendental order, the rational-moral Liṅga is true to the kindred points of the transcendental and the psycho-bio-physical. Dissolution and origination are the phases of the bio-physical. But through these changes the transcendental-rational-moral-psychological order persists.

Consequently, we find in the 42nd Kārikā that Liṅga specified according to the laws of causal determination exists like a Nata or dramatic actor surcharged with the all-powerful dynamism of Prakṛti. But all this has behind it as its main source of inspiration the fundamental ground of things viz Puruṣartha or rational Meaning.

This is the nature and function of Liṅga in the Saṁkhyā philosophy. We shall close this chapter here and leave it to the scholars to determine whether the 55th Kārikā can claim any legitimate place in this philosophy. Where has it been said that pain is the very essence of bodily existence? Where has it been said that Nirāśraya Liṅga seeks concretisation in Viśeṣas only for being afflicted with the pain of dotage and death? Where again has it been said that Liṅga is capable of being dissolved and that, again, by knowledge or

wisdom ? Is every thing delusive ? Bhāvas, their inspiration, the universal dynamism of Prakṛti,—are all these delusive ? Do they all mean only the pain of dotage and death ? Does the way to wisdom lie through the morbid visions of senile disturbance ? No, Saṃkhyā is neither scared by the dreams of a gloomy pessimist nor drawn by any eccentric fascination for the experience of an abstract ecstasy. It sends, on the other hand, the clarion-call of an active vigorous, youthful life lived for the world, in the world, and through the world.

It preaches the gospel of Action and calls upon every one to act like a self-determined Puruṣa and to live like the Pāndavas holding aloft, through all struggles and hardships, with indefatigable courage of conviction and in the unwavering contentment of resignation and reliance, the banner of Truth, Justice and Freedom.

CHAPTER VI.

The Structure of Linga

There are many Liṅgas but they are structurally identical. The analysis of one, therefore, will reveal the fundamental nature of all.

Liṅga, we have maintained, is a whole of aspects. The distinguishable aspects are, Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra, the eleven Senses and five Tanmātras. They have been further distinguished into Karāṇas and the essence of Kāryas. Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra and the eleven Senses are Karāṇas, while Tanmātras are the essence of Kāryas. We shall now study the Karāṇa-part of Liṅga.

Karāṇa means both organ and function. Indeed, they go together, for an organism is a system of functions. Liṅga as Karāṇa is, from one point of view, an organism finally realised in the Matāpitṛja body, while from another point of view, it is a synthesis of functions or synthetic functioning. The common function of these Karāṇas (not the three internal Karāṇas only, for Liṅga is a synthetic unity) is the maintenance of life. (K. 29). The specific functions are logical and social or moral of which the latter presupposes the former.

Buddhi etc. as organs are specified in the medium of Guṇas as Liṅga, this again in the medium of Tanmātras as Sūkṣma and finally, Sūkṣma in that of Bhūtas as Matāpitṛja. Their functions have been described in the following way :—

Buddhi as function is Adhyavasāya, Dharma, Jñāna, Virāga and Aisvarya or their opposites. Of these, Adhyavasāya is fundamental. The four others are derivative and are predominantly ethical. Adhyavasāya means 'meaning' in both the senses of logical construction

and moral direction. Buddhi, therefore, functions both as Reason and as Conscience.

Ahaṅkāra as function is Abhimāna *i.e.* the 'I-sense' or consciousness of self. It is Cetana (knowing), Kartā (willing), Bhokta (*i. e.* experiencing or enjoying) person (Puruṣa) or the synthetic unity of knowing, feeling and willing. It is the Jñā-posed and Jñā-inspired synthetic unity of Liṅga and hence self-conscious. It is for the same reason that it is invested with Sense-functions and is preceded by or presupposes Buddhi.

Manas is functionally Saṅkalpa *i.e.* both attention and intention. It is common to the two types of Senses, *viz.* Buddhi-senses or the Senses of knowing and Karma-senses or the Senses of action. The Senses are the synthesised differentiations of Ahaṅkāra.

From Ahaṅkāra, finally, we get Tanmātras as the essence of the objective order, and this means a differentiation within Liṅga or Ahaṅkāra between the transcending logical functions and the transcended data. So Liṅga is the structural design of a concrete person or Puruṣa as aware of a world including his own body.

Liṅga thus is a synthetic unity of functions both logical and moral. But it is said to be a Guṇa-specification or a modification of Avyakta. But Avyakta is Avivekī and Acetana. How can it, then, discharge logical and moral functions? It is a question that must be answered. Traditional Sāṃkhya replies that it is made possible by either the reflection of Buddhi or Liṅga in Puruṣa (Jñā ?) or the mutual reflection of both. The Kārikās, however, have nowhere used any term to suggest this theory of reflection. Indeed, it is an alien introduced into Sāṃkhya. The Sāṃkhya reply is straight and significant and is contained in the pregnant passage "Bhāvaiḥ Adhvivāsitam Liṅgam". Is it difficult now to understand the anxiety and difficulty to interpret or rather misinterpret the term

'Bhāvaiḥ' ? Samyoga spoken of in Kārikas 20 and 21 is the contact of Bhāva and Liṅga, meaning and experience or symbol and signification. Such a definite statement, such a clear theory has been so ruthlessly distorted to suit the peculiar doctrine of an abstract individualistic Mokṣa. This distorted account has passed unchallenged for centuries as the genuine Saṃkhyā philosophy.

Be that as it may, the facts remain that Bhāvas and Liṅga are inseparable and are absolutely necessary for each other and also that Liṅga is inspired by Bhāvas. It follows thus that Liṅga-functions, viz. Buddhi etc. are essentially the same as Bhāvas of Jñāna. Liṅga is Puruṣa simply because it is inspired by the transcendental synthetic unity of Jñāna. It is because of this unity that Liṅga is a unity. Draṣṭṛtva of Jñāna is the essence of Buddhi. It is because of Sākṣitva of Jñāna that Liṅga-Buddhi realises itself as a self-conscious person. This is Ahaṅkāra. For this reason also the synthetic Manas and the Senses are part and parcel of Ahaṅkāra.

The chief Bhāva of Jñāna is Dṛksakti or Draṣṭṛtva. Darśana and Adhyavasāya are really the same. Dṛṣṭa or Darśana is 'meaning the objective'. Buddhi as the organ of Adhyavasāya is the organ of Dṛksakti. But Buddhi as the function of Adyavasāya is non-different from Dṛksakti. The function implies the organ and the organ presupposes the function. It is for this reason that Buddhi, the organ, presupposes Avyakta while Buddhi, the function of Darśana, is presupposed by it. The several Liṅga-Puruṣas thus agree in being essentially characterised by Draṣṭṛtva or meaning the objective or Buddhi.

This Dṛksakti means the distinction between Draṣṭa and Dṛsyā. But it also means the connection of the meaner and the meant or the logical relation of meaning between the two. Buddhi corresponding to Dṛksakti is thus responsible for positing Ahaṅkāra. This Ahaṅkāra,

again, distinguishes itself with the Senses from the Sense-data or Tanmātras posited from within it. In Ahaṅkāra we find the actualisation of all Bhāvas of Jñā, viz. Sākṣitva etc. Buddhi re-appears as Manas or the function of attention and intention. The former is the function of presenting and constructing the system of knowledge and hence directly connected with the Buddhi-senses. The latter exhibiting the inner dynamism of meaning constructs the objective as a system of purposes and is hence directly connected with Karmendriyas.

The structure of Liṅga-Puruṣa is thus as interesting as it is illuminating. It is pregnant with meaning and possesses great philosophical importance. We shall try to indicate some of the most important significations here.

In the first place, Liṅga is a system of Karaṇas or a unity of functions. As such it is dynamic or constructive. As it is an instance of Jñā-Avyakta, it must also be considered as dynamic. The Karaṇas are logical and ethical functions. The dynamism of Jñā-Avyakta, therefore, must be considered as the transcendental dynamism of Meaning which means logical and therefore also moral construction. Liṅga-construction is logical and is, therefore, constructive of the objective order as Reason. It is also ethical and is therefore, constructive of the moral order as Conscience.

Secondly, Liṅga as a system of Karaṇas is constructive. But construction does not mean presentation of a ready-made objective but the enlargement of an undifferentiated datum. Liṅga-Karaṇas thus presuppose Avyakta but enlarge Guṇas into Tanmātras. Tanmātras presuppose Karaṇas. This enlargement simply means the interpretation of the presentative-conative-affective continuum (Avyakta) into a continuum of presentations of sound, touch etc. (Tanmātras). Undifferentiated experience is differentiated into more specific presentations meaning more specific objects and affecting and stimulating in more specific ways.

Thirdly, Linga, being a system of logical functions constructing Tanmātras out of Guṇas, Tanmātras must be treated as a unity in diversity and not independent entities outside one another. As co-ordinated with the Senses synthesised by Manas and Ahaṅkāra they must be treated as aspects of a whole. Again, Tanmātras account for Bhūtas and Bhūtas account for everything else. This shows that Liṅga-functions are constructive of the concrete objective order. In other words, the concrete objective order has no priority in knowledge. It is only an interpretation of experience or Jñā-Avyakta, meaning a world of things and persons of which each person is again constructive of such a world.

Fourthly, Tanmātras issue out of Ahaṅkāra. Hence logical construction is self-revelation or positing presenting, constructing and comprehending an objective order with the self as the centre of radiation and the principle of construction. Ahaṅkāra, of course, presupposes Jñā-Avyakta. But what it presupposes is part and parcel of its own constitution.

Fifthly, Ahaṅkāra presupposes Buddhi. Buddhi is Adhyavasaya i.e. is the principle that posits the personal order but is itself indicative of a transpersonal rational order, transcending but inspiring the limitations of personality. Buddhi implies self-position which presupposes self-transcendence. The order of Jñā-Avyakta is an order not of person but of principle, but they involve each other.

Sixthly, Indriyas are Sense-functions. Their functioning means the positing of the object. The Senses of knowledge are involved in the construction of the world as a system of objects. Karmendriyas are involved in the construction of the world as a system of purposes or objects of desire.

Bosanquet has said that given the perceptive state and the mental equipment the judgment follows. Saṃkhya has given the perceptive state in Jñā's Darsana or Draṣṭṛtva, and the mental equipment in Liṅga, the

judgment should, therefore, follow. We propose to discuss afterwards the Kārikās, that have described this judgment or the logical construction of the objective order.

There is one more important significance of the structure of Liṅga. We have seen that Liṅga is a world constructing itself. It is really an objective order so organised as to be conscious of being a Puruṣa or Person. This consciousness is due not to the reflection but to the inspiration of Jñāna. It follows, therefore, that Puruṣa is a self-conscious world. The essence of Puruṣa is in the objective order of things. It is neither other-worldly nor unworldly. To be Puruṣa is to be a world. This proves our contention that Vyakta is really Vyakti for it is nothing other than Jñāna-inspired-Liṅga-Viśeṣa. It is an instance of Jñāna-Avyakta or an individual or a world aware of itself.

Again, Vyakta is Aneka i.e. there are many Vyaktis or Liṅga-Puruṣas. This is the so-called Vahūpuruṣavāda of Sāṃkhya. Sāṃkhya, however, goes beyond this plurality of Puruṣas or worlds. They are instances of one Jñāna meaning Avyakta, or Jñāna-Avyakta. Jñāna-Avyakta is the type, Vyaktas are instances. The type and the instances necessarily go together. Taken apart from each other they are abstractions of thought (K. 52). Hence Reality is Vyaktavyaktajñāna. It means that Reality is at once a system of infinite instances of system, a world of many instances of world and a society of persons or Puruṣas.

Traditional Sāṃkhya has left out of account the most important category of Jñāna and has thus missed the logical point of view of the Sāṃkhya philosophy. Some think that the Sāṃkhya categories are 26 in number. It is so indeed. But the 26th category is not God but Jñāna, the unique logical subject, the knower in all knowledge. It is the unity that persists through all plurality, that makes thought one, though the thinkers are many, logic one, though the logicians are many.

CHAPTER VII.

Vyakta and Avyakta.

We shall now discuss the Kārikās in which the nature of the two aspects of reality called Vyakta and Avyakta has been described. This separation of Vyakta and Avyakta from Jñāna, though convenient for certain purposes, must be considered as much an abstraction as the separation of Vyakta from Avyakta. We have contended that the Real is actually Vyaktavyaktajñāna. Vyakta is a Purusa aware of an objective order and thus assuming towards it the attitude of cognition, conation and affection (Jñāta, Kartā and Bhokta). It is an instance of Jñāna-Avyakta.

Apart from Jñāna, Vyakta is only the objective order, the bio-physical system or Pāñcabhautika Liṅgavīśeṣa. It is said to be characterised by the properties of being caused, mutable, pervaded, having Kriyā or Parispanda i.e. unceasing interaction of parts, being many, dependent, Liṅga or symbolic, formed and other-determined (Paratantra). All this we find in the 10th Kārikā. The same Kārikā tells us further that Avyakta is the reverse of Vyakta in all these respects. Avyakta may, therefore, be said to be uncaused, unchanging, pervading, without Kriya i.e. without mutual interaction of parts (but not without Pravṛtti). It is one, self-sufficient, not symbolic (but the symbolising medium), formless and self-determined. In the 11th Kārikā we are further told that both Vyakta and Avyakta are constituted by three Guṇas. They are both non-moral objective, unconscious, Samanya and Prasavadharmi. Samanya means identical and Prasavadharmi means multiplying into instances.

There are certain very important points to be noted here. (a) Vyakta is a whole. Avyakta is also a whole. Are they outside each other? Evidently not, for the pervading and the pervaded can neither be outside each other nor separated in time. The pervasion referred to here is not physical or spatial pervasion but logical or connotative pervasion (see K. 15). Vyaktas are wholes, Avyakta is the whole of these wholes. It is the identity that pervades the instances from within, so to say. (b) Avyakta is one and yet Prasavadharmī i. e. multiplies into instances. There should, then, be many Avyaktas. But it is not so, simply because each instance of Avyakta is a Vyakta and not an Avyakta. Vyaktas multiply but each instance of Vyakta is also an instance of Avyakta. The type or the identity exists in the instances. Avyakta is the identity of the specific instances. Hence it is a mistake to suppose that Avyakta can exist apart from Vyaktas. The actual objective is, for this reason, neither Vyakta alone, nor Avyakta alone but Vyaktavyakta. Avyakta is really the system in all systems.

(c) Avyakta is without Kriyā but is yet characterised by Kaivalyārtham Pravṛtti.¹ It means that Avyakta, being not the part of a whole, is without the interaction that characterises the parts of a whole. On the other hand, being a whole, it is characterised by systematic activity. It operates as a whole (K. 16). Kaivalyārtham is derived from Kevala which means one or single. Kaivalya means singleness or unity. Kaivalyārtha means for realising this unity. Avyakta tends to realise the unity that Jñā is. Hence it is that Vyaktas are individuals or unities or Liṅga-Viśeṣas. Avyakta is the unity in all unities.

(d) Vyakta is symbolic but Avyakta is not. The instance is the symbol of the kind but not vice versa. This is why Liṅga is Purvotpanna. For Avyakta to be is to be Liṅga or better a plurality of Liṅgas.

1. Individualising causality mentioned by Hans Driesch, is its nearest equivalent. History and Theory of Vitalism.

(e) Avyakta is immutable because the unity of unities is not mutable. Vyakta is mutable in so far as the Matapitṛja body or the physiological system is subject to generation and disintegration. There is perpetual readjustment in the world of five Bhūtas. The Bhautika unities are dissoluble but the Tanmātrika unities are not. The system in systematic construction persists.

(f) The cause or Avyakta is thus continuous through the effect. So far there is nothing to suggest that Avyakta first exists in a state of stable equilibrium and then begins to evolve. On the other hand, there are definite reasons to hold that the objective is a continuous construction eternally going on without beginning and without end. The objective is a system ever realising itself in infinite instances of system. It is the whole of wholes, the unity of unities.

(g) Vyaktas are many, hence distinct and finite but in and through these finite distincts the one undifferentiated Avyakta is being realised.

The question now is :—Why should Vyakta be considered as caused ? Why should it not be uncaused ? To this we get the answer in the 15th Kārikā. The reasons given are :—

(1) *Bhedanām Parimāṇat*. Finite distincts have a cause. It means that such bodies do not contain their own explanation. What contains its own explanation is, therefore, neither finite nor distinct. It is one and infinite. This disposes of the theory of many ultimate distincts attributed to Sāṃkhya. The ultimate self-explaining ground must be infinite and one. It strikes again at the very root of the theory of wholesale Pralaya or the return of Vyaktas into Avyakta. There can be no termination of infinite construction.

(2) “*Saktitāḥ Pravṛttiḥ*”. Pravṛtti here evidently refers to *Bhedanām*. It means, therefore, the endeavours of the distinct bodies. But what is meant by *Saktitāḥ* ? Of

course, endeavours mean energy. But if the energy be the energy of the finite distincts themselves, then it cannot lead to the conclusion of the existence of a cause other than Vyakta. Hence it must be understood to mean that the endeavours of the finite distincts being made possible by an energy not their own as finite distincts, there must be a cause and this cause must be dynamic.

(3) "Kāraṇakāryavibhāgat". It means that Vyakta being a continuous disimplication or construction, the logical distinction of cause and effect necessarily applies to it. It is necessary to think of a constructive process as distinguished into cause and effect. Not only that. The cause must be understood as relatively implicit and the effect as relatively explicit. But the cause is yet not to be considered as separated from the effect by any interval of time. Avyakta with its Guṇas is continuous through all effects or Vyaktas. (See Avibhāga Vaiśvārūpyasya).

Vyaktas or Bhedas must, therefore, be considered as caused.

It may be said : Granted all this, but why should the cause be one ?

The reply is :—

(1) Samanvayat i. e. because the finite distincts correspond inspite of their distinctions.

(2) Because Vaiśvārūpya is Avibhāga. Gauḍapāda has interpreted Vaiśvārūpya as Viśvam Jagat Tasya Rūpam Vyaktih, Viśvarūpam Tasya Bhāvah Vaiśvārūpyam. Viśvarūpa really means the world as an individual or the individual as essentially a world. It has been used in this very sense in the Bhagavadgītā. Vaiśvārūpyam means the character of being a world so organised as to be a Liṅga-Viśeṣa or a Puruṣa. Again, these Vyaktis or Puruṣas form inseparable parts of the universal whole. Now, Avibhāga means inseparable unity. The whole passage means, therefore, that inseparable and indissoluble unity

being the necessary implication of the character of being a world or an individual or a universe the cause must be a unity-in-difference. Avyakta is, for this reason, the unity of Guṇas.

The argument for the unity of the cause may, therefore, be stated thus :—Because the finite distincts correspond and because they are individualised worlds or systems or wholes—forming inseparable parts of the universe, the cause, therefore, is also a systematic unity. All the above arguments taken together prove that :—

- (1). There is one cause
- (2). This cause is an undifferentiated whole or Avyakta of Guṇas.
- (3). It operates as a whole (Samudayat).
- (4). It contains within it the possibilities of various determinations. The basis of these determinations is its own Guṇas (K. 16). It does not negate a plurality of finite distincts but ever differentiates into and maintains them.

Kārikās 15 and 16 go together fully and not in part, as the commentators want us to believe. It is further surprising how Avibhāga has been forced to mean Pralaya. There is one other very important significance of these two Kārikās. It is the absolutely rational way in which the existence of Avyakta has been established as the necessary presupposition of the ever-changing world of corresponding finite and distinct but inseparably related wholes. Avyakta is not the object of any mysterious Yogaja perception but a necessary inference of logical thinking. It is real as a necessity of thought and is ever known through its effects. We do not know what to say when we are asked to believe, against all that these Kārikās propound, that 'Sustha Puruṣa' beholds, in wisdom, Avyakta as such (K. 65).

It may be further asked : Why should the cause be Avyakta and not Vyakta ? The answer has already been indicated. It is that the objective is a continuous construction. But reason revolts against the conception of magic and miracle or an absolute surprise of novelty. Consequently, what becomes must be treated as only an unfoldment or disimplication. The cause must, therefore, be Avyakta or undifferentiated and the effect must be the differentiation of the implicit.

But the most important question still remains to be discussed. It is : How can Avyakta which is Acetana be called the 'reverse of Paratantra' or self-determined ? Where is the self in the objective ? Yet the fact remains that the differentiation of Avyakta means the emergence of Liṅga. What is again this Liṅga ? It is so constituted as to be the fit symbol of subject-object. There are Karanas or the mental equipment and Tanmātras or the objective data. The only thing wanted is the inspiration of Jñā. When that is given, it will at once be a world conscious of being a person transcending but inspiring the objective or a Liṅga-Puruṣa. This shows how impossible it is to keep out the principle of consciousness or Jñā from Vyaktavyakta.

The self-differentiation of Avyakta is an undeniable fact ; but it only means that the principle of the self is already in it, that it is wholly permeated by it. The objective Avyakta cannot be separated from Jñā or Puruṣartha.

Avyakta as Viṣaya necessarily presupposes Viṣayī, the object necessarily presupposes the subject. Yet the subject that Avyakta presupposes is not Puruṣa but Jñā. Puruṣa is connected with Liṅga-Viśeṣa. Each Liṅga is a Puruṣa or an instance of Jñā-Avyakta. Puruṣa is Vyakta but Jñā is the soul of Avyakta. Hence there are as many Puruṣas as there are Liṅgas but Jñā-Avyakta is one.

Jñā and the objective Avyakta are, therefore, two aspects of the same thing. Jñā means Avyakta and Avyakta is meant by Jñā. Meaning or Jñā, therefore, cannot be taken out of Avyakta. Hence it is a system and acts as a whole and produces wholes. As such Avyakta cannot be matter. It is without the independence, alienation and divisibility of matter.

Objectivity and materiality are certainly not synonymous. As pervaded by Meaning Avyakta is different from mere quiddity or material substratum foreign to the nature of the Meaner. It is the Meaning Jñā's experience and hence characterised by identical or objective reference or Samanyaatva. It is the experience meaning, but not caused by, the objective order, for this order presupposes Avyakta and Avyakta presupposes Puruṣartha.

Avyakta is uncaused or Avikṛti. Jñā does not cause it but means it. Hence Avyakta requires an Adhiṣṭhāna which is the reverse of Triguṇa i.e. the non-objective or transcendental subject i.e. Jñā (K. 17). Jñā and Avyakta necessarily go together. Avyakta is the synthetic experience of the transcendental Meaner or Jñā. It is undifferentiated experience because Liṅga, the vehicle of differentiation, is still implicit. But it is not non-existent. Hence neither Jñā nor Avyakta is non-existent. Though existent, they are not actual but the logical grounds of the actual. Treated apart from the actual, they are mere abstractions of thought. Taken with the actual, they are the soul and substance of the universe of individualised worlds, each conscious of being a Puruṣa. Puruṣas correspond and hence the inference of the existence of a common principle of intelligence meaning an identical objective order.

We have said that Avyakta is undifferentiated experience. That it is so will be evident from the description of Guṇas. In the 12th Kārikā Guṇas have been described as *identical* with Pṛiti, Apriti and Viṣada i.e. pleasure, pain and gloom. These are feelings or better

characteristics of immediate experience. Again, their Artha or function is said to be Prakāśa, Pravṛtti and Niyama. These terms mean presentation, conation and affection respectively. Affection is distinguished from conation in as much as the latter represents the active while the former the passive side of experience.

The second line of the 12th Kārika states further that the three Guṇas involve, modify, support one another and operate together as one. This shows that every bit of experience has all the three characteristics but in varying proportions. They are so related that when one predominates others are suppressed but not eliminated. This is also the relation of cognition, conation and affection.

It is further stated in the 13th Kārika that :—

- (1). Sattva is Prakāśaka i.e. presentative and Laghu or light as distinguished from Tamas.
- (2). Rajas is stimulating or driving to action.
- (3). Tamas is Guru or heavy and Varanaka or veiling or covering as distinguished from Sattva,

It is indeed a pity that this perfect analysis of experience should be so misunderstood in the country of its origin, that Guṇas should be treated as the cousins of atoms and electrons and described as the particles or units of substances. The Kārikas concerned have certainly maintained that they are aspects or qualities or Guṇas of a synthetic unity called Avyakta and meaning undifferentiated presentative-conative-affective experience continuum.

The charge of Panpsychism or Subjective Idealism cannot yet be levelled against the Saṃkhyā philosophy, for Guṇas or the course of experience-complex has been said to function like the lamp towards Artha or Puru-

śartha or Indriyārtha or Padartha or Viṣaya or object. Meaning is characterised by objective or identical reference. There can be no meaning that does not mean an object. Consequently, experience or Avyakta is characterised by objective reference. In other words experience means the objective order. The metaphor of the lamp has to be taken with important reservations. The lamp, of course, makes objects visible.¹ But these objects exist outside and independent of the lamp. In the case of Avyakta or Guṇas, however, there is no objective order outside and independent of them. Consequently, the metaphor is highly misleading. Avyakta or the Guṇa-continuum must, therefore, be taken as constitutive of the objective order of things. The objective is thus an enlargement or unfoldment of experience.

It is because Avyakta is undifferentiated *experience-continuum* that it differentiates into the presentations of sound, colour, touch, taste and smell. These are five Tanmātras. Bhūtas are the modifications of Tanmātras. It means that the so-called physical objective universe is a construct of presentative-complex or experience.

This objective includes the organism of Buddhi, Ahankāra, and Indriyas. But the functions of Adhyavasāya, Abhimāna, Saṅkalpa and Ālocana are not objective but the transcendental presuppositions of the objective. They have, therefore, been called Bhāvas and have also been distinguished from the Linga—organism as Sāṃsiddhikāḥ. All these Bhāvas are implied in the two Bhāvas of Śākṣitva and Draṣṭṛtva. The relation of Bhāvas and Linga has been clearly stated in Kārikā 52. One is never found without the other. (See Ch IV).

Our interpretation of Avyakta makes the transition from Guṇa to Tanmātra and from Tanmātra to Bhūta, perfectly intelligible. It is really the transition from the undifferentiated presentative—conative-affective continuum

1. See Gauḍapāda, Commentary K. 36.

to the more specific presentations of sound, touch and other Tanmātras and from these latter to the more specific Bhūtas of earth etc. and their compounds.

Such is the concept of Avyakta and yet for ages it has passed for something material. Yet there was a time when it was differently understood and then it was that the concepts of Alayavijñana or Ālayavijñana or Vijñana-santāna and the entire system of Vijñanavāda Buddhism were propounded and developed. To the philosopher it is an indisputable fact that Buddhism in its Logic and Ethics is the offspring of the Sāṃkhya line of thought.

CHAPTER VIII.

Jñā and Puruṣa.

So far we have taken it for granted that Jñā and Puruṣa are not absolutely identical categories. But we have neither clearly stated what the distinction between them is, nor have we given our reasons for distinguishing between them. The author of the Kārikās have, of course, dropped the term Jñā after the second Kārikā and have throughout used the term Pumān or Puruṣa. But even then there is very strong evidence to show that the term Pumān or Puruṣa has not always been used in the same sense.

In the 3rd Kārikā we are told that Puruṣa is neither Prakṛti nor Vikṛti *i.e.* as we find in the 11th Kārikā, it is the reverse of Triguṇa (*i.e.* transcendental), of Aviveki (*i.e.* having moral discrimination), of Viṣaya (*i.e.* non-objective subject), of Saṁanya (*i.e.* unique as distinguished from any objective identity) and of Prasavadharmī (*i.e.* not multiplying into distinct instances but ever retaining its integral unity or singleness).

In that very Kārikā we find it stated that Pumān is "Tathāca". Vācaspati has taken it to mean "yet also (in some respects) similar to Vyakta and Avyakta." The question is: Why should "Tathāca" mean similarity *in some respects*? Who is to decide what these respects are? Gaudapāda says that Puruṣa resembles Avyakta in being one, while Vācaspati says that it resembles Vyakta in being many. Again, Puruṣa has been said to be the reverse of Triguṇa and yet one of the reasons for inferring its plurality is said to be "Traiguṇyaviparyayatca" *i.e.*, as interpreted by these very commentators, on account of the modifications of Guṇas being different. The question is:

Why should different Guna-modifications mean a plurality of Puruṣas when Puruṣa is the reverse of Triguna ?

This is, we believe, enough to create a legitimate suspicion that there is some confusion in the current commentaries about the nature and meaning of Puruṣa in the Sāṃkhya philosophy. We propose to proceed a little further keeping "Tadviparitah tathā ca" of the 11th Karikā prominently in view.

In Karikā 17 we get the reasons for the conclusion that Puruṣa exists. They are :—

(a) "Saṅghātapaṛarthatvāt." Saṅghāta means objective organism. The argument, therefore, means that objective organisms do not explain themselves. They are neither self-existent nor self-evident. All objects have meaning for another, *viz.* the subject.

(2). "Triguṇādiparyayat Adhiṣṭhanāt." The objective organisms require a self-existent and self-evident ground (Adhiṣṭhana). It must again be the reverse of Triguna i.e. non-objective and transcendental in order to avoid a regressus ad infinitum.

This ground, therefore, must be conceived as self-meaning or with Artha. Consequently, it cannot be said to be passive. It means and meaning is certainly not a sign of passivity. It is a transcendental act of which all other acts are mere symbols.

(3) "Bhoktṛbhāvāt" The objective Avyakta is experience. But experience as objective does not experience itself. Nor can it be conceived as rising out of and disappearing into a void. The ground that it necessarily presupposes must be characterised by at least the possibility (Bhāva) of being Bhuktā i.e. an experient.

(4) "Kaivalyārtham Pravṛttēḥ" This Pravṛtti is evidently the characteristic of Avyakta. It is called Kaivalyārtham simply because Avyakta tends to be the individualised Liṅga. This Liṅga is a unity and is symbolic of

one subject from the logical point of view. Hence this Pravṛtti is a proof that there exists a non-objective subjective principle characterised by the Bhāva of being Kevala or single or one without a second of its own standard, objectifying itself in the medium of its own experience as Lingas.

This Kārikā, therefore, proves the existence of Puruṣa as the one non-objective ground whose meaning is realised in the objective order. The term Puruṣa here means the transcendental (Triguṇādiviparyaya) synthetic principle of Meaning. (See Kārikā 19).

In the 18th Kārikā, the plurality of Puruṣas has been established on the ground that :—

(1) birth, death and body (Karaṇānām) are several.

(2) the efforts and endeavours are different in different individuals at the same time e.g. when one is sleeping another may be reading and so on.

(3) Guṇas cannot be distributed in the same way in different individuals. It is against the nature of Avyakta to repeat what is absolutely the same. There must always be identity-in-difference.

It is quite clear now that Puruṣa has been used here in an absolutely different sense. This Puruṣa is not the transcendental unity that is the reverse of Triguṇa. It is the embodied Puruṣa that goes through the phases of birth and death. It is, therefore, Linga as Matāpitṛja Viśeṣa. It is Linga-Puruṣa.

We find, therefore, that the term Puruṣa has been used in two senses. In the one sense, it means the transcendental unity (Logical); in the other, it is an empirical instance of this unity (Psychological). Now we can say that “Tadviparitah tathā ca” of Kārikā 11 refers to this double meaning of Puruṣa. For the sake of clearness we should refer to the transcendental by the term Jñā and the empirical by the term Puruṣa. Vyakta, being an instance of

Avyakta, is also an instance of Jñā and hence Liṅga is an instance of subject-object or Puruṣa.

The plurality of Puruṣas therefore, means the plurality of Liṅga-Puruṣas and does not mean the plurality of the transcendental Jñā. A plurality of transcendental Puruṣas, apart from its inherent weakness, cannot be attributed to the Sāṃkhya philosophy for the following reasons :—

(a) Puruṣa has been described as Asāmānya and Aviṣaya i.e. the unique non-objective Subject. If there were many trascendental Puruṣas, they must either know one another or not. If they know one another, none of them can be called unique and non-objective. If they do not know one another, none of them can be said to be Jñā, for each of them would be partly Ajñā, and Puruṣartha itself would be adversely affected. Consequently, Puruṣabahūtvā must mean Liṅga-bahūtvā.

(b) To explain the plurality of Liṅga-Puruṣas Prasavadharma of Avyakta is enough. Sāṃkhya does not consider it impossible for the transcendental unity to maintain its integrity inspite of a plurality of Liṅgas. This is so even with Avyakta. It is one but Vyaktas are many; yet it pervades them all. Further Prasa-vadharma of Avyakta must be in the meaning of Jñā though Jñā in itself is Aprasavadharmī.

The 19th Kārikā means to say that this Jñā, being distinguished from all that is objective and considered in itself, is a unity of certain Bhāvas or transcendental features. They are :

- (1) Kaivalya i.e. singleness or unity and hence also transcendence.
- (2) Mādhyasthya i.e. centrality or the 'quality' of being the central principle of Liṅgas or Vyaktavyakta.
- (3) Sakṣitva i.e. self-evidence or self-consciousness

- (4) Draṣṭṛtvā *i.e.* the possibility of Prativiṣayādhyavasāya *i.e.* meaning or positing the objective and hence the perceptive state.
- (5) Akartṛtvā *i.e.* the state of being non-causal and non-volitional rational principle of Meaning and hence the Transcendental Act implying causal and volitional agency.

Jñā is, therefore, the synthetic unity of Meaning or the transcendental self-conscious principle which is the central ground and, therefore, the Reason or Artha of all that is or becomes. Being the principle of Meaning it means the objective Avyakta. What it means is itself in the medium of its own experience. Hence Avyakta necessarily means Liṅga and Liṅga is the symbol of Jñā. Liṅga is thus the objective order conscious of itself as a Puruṣa aware of a world.

In the 21st Kārikā we are told that Sarga or Pratyaya-sarga or logical construction presupposes both Jñā and Avyakta. Jñā without Avyakta is lame *i.e.* devoid of the medium of self-realisation and Avyakta without Jñā is blind *i.e.* devoid of rational meaning. The two, however, are not really two, for they are the two terms of a connection of meaning. This mutual connection is indicated by the terms Darśanārtha and Kaivalyārtha (Pravṛtti). Darśana means the transcendental Adhyavasāya *i.e.* meaning or positing and presenting or perceiving. Avyakta thus stands to Jñā in the unique non-causal relation of perception. This relation of perception must necessarily mean the unfoldment of the objective and the emergence of Liṅga-Puruṣas. This Darśana, therefore, really amounts to self-finding on the part of Jñā.

Our construction of the 21st Kārikā differs from that of 'Vācaspati'. It is "Puruṣasya darśanārtham tathā pradhānasya kaivalyārtham (pravṛtteḥ)." We have explained Puruṣasya Darśana as Jñā's self-finding. This explains also the Kaivalyārtham Pravṛtti of Pradhāna;

for the unfoldment of Avyakta can only mean the objectification of Jñā. It is so, because what Jñā means or the meaning of the objective must be Jñā itself. Liṅga may be said to be the other of Jñā. Hence the Pravṛtti of Pradhāna is Kaivalyārtha or refers to the self-finding of Kevala Jñā. It only means that subject and object necessarily and inseparably involve one another, so that subject is the subject of object and the object is the object of subject. This unique relation is usually expressed by 'and'. But 'and' is more often understood to mean external conjunction than connection of content or meaning. The confusion between these two senses of 'and' explains the fallacy of all realistic theories that treat the object as existing independently of the subject. Saṃkhyā, however, has not fallen a prey to this fallacy.

This Kārikā has been so far misunderstood that eminent scholars have not hesitated to characterise Saṃkhyā as realistic or dualistic. It is, however, neither the one nor the other. For it lays due emphasis on the connection of meaning or Puruṣartha.

Jñā-Avyakta connection means Jñā-Liṅga connection. So we find in the 20th Kārikā "Tasmāt tat samyogat." Indeed this Kārikā should come after the 21st. It has surely been misplaced. Jñā-Liṅga connection means Puruṣa as Cetana or self-conscious and Kartā i.e. a causal and volitional agent. The nature of this connection has been described in Kārikā 40 as "Bhavaiḥ Adhvīśitam Lingam".

This connection, further, means the actualisation of Jñā with its Bhāvas. In the 52nd Kārikā, therefore, we are told that Liṅga is never without Bhāvas and Bhāvas are never realised without Liṅga. The construction that reality is, has thus two aspects, Bhavakhyā and Lingākhya i.e. the meaning-aspect and the symbol-aspect,

the transcendental aspect and the empirical aspect, the logical aspect and the objective aspect.

This shows that Jñā-Avyakta ever exists in Vyakta and that Vyakta or the actual is the perpetual actualisation of the Transcendental Rational Meaning or Jñā in the medium of its own experience. The actual is a number of Vyaktas or Vyaktis or Puruṣas each aware of a world of things and persons. Jñā is the common nature of intelligence in them all and Avyakta is the type of the objective order, reference to which is the very essence of Jñā as the principle of Meaning or Darsana. Jñā is not a mirror but the one Meaner in each instance of the self-conscious objective order or Liṅga-Puruṣa. Meaning does not enter into a plurality though it is a meaning of Meaning to be realised in a plurality of instances. This is why Avyakta is Prasavadharmī but Jñā is not.

Through all these distinctions and interrelations we get the conclusion that Reality is the self-differentiation, self-construction and self-comprehension of Reason as Transcendental Meaning or Puruṣārtha. It is the realisation of a rational and moral order through the individualised Liṅga-viśeṣas.

We shall close this chapter by drawing pointed attention to the fact that the theory of a beginning and an end of unfoldment is absolutely without any foundation. Darsana of Jñā is not a passing phase of its nature. Draṣṭṛtva is an inseparable feature or 'Bhāva' of its unity. For Jñā to be means perpetual self-finding and self-distinguishing. It is an eternal conflict between truth and error, justice and injustice and an equally eternal triumph of truth over untruth and justice over injustice. Pralaya is, therefore, the fiction of the psychologist while eternal self-construction of Reality is the considered verdict of the logician.

CHAPTER IX.

Knowledge as Construction of the Objective.

We shall try to describe in this chapter the genuine Sāṃkhya theory of knowledge. Our conclusions in this respect, as in others, have differed from the traditional account. That account starts from the contact of the external sense-organ with the sense-object and then traces the sense-datum through Manas, Ahaṅkāra and Buddhi to the final presentation of the datum to Puruṣa by Buddhi. Knowledge proper arises only when Puruṣa takes cognisance of this Buddhi-presented datum.

This account seems to us to have missed the essential features of the Sāṃkhya theory of knowledge. To understand this theory properly it is necessary to bear in mind the nature, place and function of Linga-Puruṣa. This Puruṣa, as an instance of Jñā-Avyakta, is an instance of a self-presenting, self-constructing and self-comprehending Reality. It is really a dynamic personal-objective order. It is, on the one hand, a system of Karāṇas or functions and, on the other, a presentative continuum (Tāmātras). Again, it occupies a necessary place in Reality. Linga-Karāṇas are the necessary media of the actualisation of Jñā-Avyakta.

Linga-Puruṣa, therefore, is a self-constructing whole or order. This self-construction necessarily involves the construction of the objective order. The Person is constructed along with the objective order and the objective order along with the Person. Really speaking, the order is, as we have said, the Person+objective order. Hence it is said that the sole motive of (Jñā-) Avyakta is to find itself in Puruṣa and the highest function of Puruṣa is to construct and comprehend (Jñā-) Avyakta. It means that the function of Linga-

Puruṣa is self-realisation in the construction of a natural-social or logical-moral order (Jñāna-Karma-Samuccaya).

We shall here confine ourselves to the discussion of the nature of knowledge as the construction of the objective order and take up the construction of the moral order in the next chapter. The defect of the traditional interpretation of the Sāṃkhya theory of knowledge is that it is partial and therefore highly misleading. In the first place, it seems to suggest that Buddhi, Ahaṅkara and Manas can operate independently of one another as opposed to operating as a whole. Secondly, it implies that knowledge arises out of the reflection of an external objective order on Jñāna or Puruṣa. Thirdly, it definitely suggests that the objects with which the sense-organs come into contact exist as finished products independently of the constructive principle of intelligence. We shall see presently that the texts do not confirm any of these suggestions.

Logically viewed, Linga-Puruṣa is a relatively constructed principle of construction. As relatively constructed it presupposes itself in Jñāna-Avyakta and means further construction of itself in Jñāna-Avyakta. In other words, it is a dynamic constructive agency (Prakṛti-Vikṛti) presupposed by only Vikṛtis (five Bhūtas and eleven Senses) and presupposing Jñāna, the principle of all construction (neither Prakṛti nor Vikṛti) and Mūla Prakṛti, the primarily *meant* but not constructed datum (Avikṛti). It is clear, therefore, that the presuppositions of Linga are relatively undifferentiated and its function is always to differentiate it more and more fully. Logical Construction or knowledge cannot, therefore, be treated as concerned with a ready-made objective.

. When we turn to the texts the 36th Kārikā claims the first attention. As translated by Dr. Jha it runs thus :—

"These, the external organs together with Manas and *Ahaṅkāra*, characteristically differing from one another, and being different modifications of the attributes (*Gūpas*) resemble a lamp in action ; and as such having first enlightened the Spirit's purpose present it in its entirety to Buddhi."

This translation, having followed the traditional interpretation has missed the real significance of this Kārikā. In the first place, *Puruṣasya Artham* should not be taken to mean the spirit's purpose. Spirit here refers to *Liṅga-Puruṣa*. This *Puruṣa* discharges both logical and moral or purposive functions. It knows and acts. It is a rational-moral system and is constructive of the world of Science and Philosophy and also the society of Morality and Ethics. Purpose refers to only one aspect of *Artha* and ignores the other. *Artha* should, therefore, be taken to mean 'Meaning' which comprehends both Reason and Purpose or Knowledge and Action. *Saṃkhyā* not only means 'Meaning' by *Artha* but considers that logical Meaning or *Jñāna* is presupposed by moral Meaning or *Karma*. That it is so may be seen from the following statements :—

- (a) The fundamental principle of construction has been called *Jña*.
- (b) *Draṣṭṛtva* and *Sākṣitva* go with *Akartṛtva*.
- (c) *Akartṛtva* is the ground of *Kartṛtva*.

Secondly, *Artham Prakāśya* does not mean enlightening the purpose (of the spirit) but positing or objectifying the Meaning that *Jña-Avyakta* is, viz. a world of natural-social worlds or individuals. This is further proved by the word *Kṛtsnam*. The universe is posited in its entirety. But that which is posited is always relatively undifferentiated. There is, therefore, room for further construction.

Thirdly, the metaphor of the lamp should not be

taken literally. The point of the metaphor lies in the fact that the lamp is presentative of the objective (Pradi-pavat Viṣaya Prakāśakah. Gauḍapāda). The point to be guarded against is that the lamp presupposes independent ready-made objects but Liṅga-Puruṣa does not. It is an instance of the self-positing and self-presenting Reality. No doubt it presupposes Avyakta but it is, first of all, implicit and then exists as the very stuff of Liṅga-Puruṣa. Avyakta again presupposes Jñāna. Hence the objective has no priority in knowledge.

Fourthly, the term Viśeṣah is considered to exclude Buddhi. It is not quite true. Buddhi is the presupposition of Ahaṅkāra etc. The functions of Ahaṅkāra are only differentiations of Buddhi. Ahaṅkāra etc. can posit and thus present the Meaning of Puruṣa in its entirety only as resting on Buddhi. Buddhi as Adhyavasaya is the necessary precondition of, and realised through, Ahaṅkāra with the Sense-functions. Really speaking, Buddhi posits itself as Ahaṅkāra and through it the objective. Ahaṅkāra etc. positing the objective present it to Buddhi. Buddhi posits and also comprehends. Buddhi again can discharge all these functions simply because it is the organ of, and thus Adhivasa by, Adhyavasaya or Draṣṭṛtva and Sakṣitva. Buddhi is thus Adhyatma, the objective in its entirety is its Adhibhuta, and Jñāna or Puruṣa is its Adhideva.

The 36th Kārikā should, therefore, be translated thus:— The Karapas (functioning organs), which are the Guṇa-specifications (of the Bhāvas) and are peculiarly differentiated from one another, posit or objectify (presupposing Adhyavasaya of Buddhi) the Meaning of Puruṣa in its entirety (as the universe of natural-social worlds or individuals) and present it to Buddhi. Thus they resemble a lamp in action (which is presentative of the objective).

The position and presentation of the objective in its entirety being given, the function of the Karapas is

next to interpret this relatively undifferentiated datum and construct a world of distinct things and persons. This construction is only disimplication. It is perceptual (*Dṛṣṭa*), inferential (*Anumana*) and finally, it is the comprehension of meaning in its entirety or construction as *Āptavacana*.

Buddhi, *Ahankara*, *Manas* and the five Buddhi-senses discharge their peculiar functions. But it does not mean that they can function independently of one another. *Linga* is a synthetic unity of differentiated functions and functions as a whole. This has been stated unambiguously in the 31st *Kārikā*. The *Karaṇas* discharge their peculiar functions which involve and imply one another. Their functioning is indissolubly bound up with "Meaning" or *Puruṣārtha*. They presuppose Meaning, are operated by Meaning, and are directed towards Meaning. Nothing else can ever move them to action. This means that *Linga* is necessarily involved in the self-differentiation, self-construction and self-comprehension of Meaning. *Jñā* or *Puruṣa*, as the principle of *Artha* or Meaning, is a dynamic category. It is so even if it means purpose. It is, indeed, strange that *Puruṣa* should be considered as passive.

The 32nd *Kārikā* seems to be the most misunderstood of all. It runs thus : *Karaṇa* is of thirteen kinds. Each of them has, of course, its peculiar function. But all these diverse functions are, from one point of view, reducible to three, viz. *Āharāṇa*, *Dhāraṇa* and *Prakāśa-kara*. *Āharāṇa* is said to be seizing or compassing, *Dhāraṇa* is maintaining or retaining and *Prakāśa* is manifesting or presenting. Commentators have attempted to classify *Karaṇas* according as they discharge one or other of these functions. *Vācaspati* says that *Āharāṇa* is the function of the *Karma-senses*, *Dhāraṇa* of the three internal *Karaṇas* and *Prakāśa* of the *Buddhi-senses*. *Dhāraṇa*, he says further, is concerned with the main-

tenance of the vital functions. According to Gauḍapāda, Āharāṇa and Dhāraṇa are the functions of the Karma-senses ; while Prakāśa is the function of the Buddhi-senses. He does not mention the three internal Karāṇas.

The question now is : Does this Kārikā really mean what the commentators say ? Are we to understand that Dhāraṇa means the retention of life only? Is there nothing else to be retained ? Is there nothing like retention of experiences both intellectual and active and formation of habit ? Again, why should Āharāṇa mean the function of the senses of Karma ? Even if it means that, how can Utsarga which is one of the Karma-senses be said to be a form of Āharāṇa ? Similarly, is there no difference between Viharāṇa and Āharāṇa ? Lastly, why should Prakāśa be the function of Buddhi-senses alone ? Does not speech, at any rate, present or reveal or manifest ? Is not action, in general, presentative ?

These are only some of the questions that create a legitimate suspicion that the commentators have bungled. We are inclined to interpret this Kārikā differently. It means that the thirteen functions, *viz.* Adhyavasaya, Abhimāna, Sāṅkalpa etc., involve the operations of Āharāṇa, Dhāraṇa and Prakāśa. Each of them signifies vital, psychological and logical functions.

Āharāṇa and Āhārya are the two forms used in this Kārikā. Similarly Dhāraṇa has got Dhārya and Prakāśa has got Prakāśya. Āharāṇa etc. mean functions and Āhārya etc., mean the objects involved in their functioning. Āharāṇa seems to mean the function of assimilation. It involves selection, elimination and integration. Dhāraṇa is retention or the act of having firm hold on, and Prakāśa is presentation. Karāṇas being Guṇa-Viśeṣaḥ, it may very well be that they are, as involving Sattva, presentative, as involving Tamas, retentive and as involving Rajas, integrative.

The objects towards which they, as Psycho-Logical functions, are directed are ten, viz. the five Tanmātras and the five Bhūtas. They are to be assimilated, retained and presented as the objective. It is not at all necessary to classify these objects into the superhuman five and the human five as Vācaspati has done. As vital functions, they are concerned with the assimilation of food, air, light, water etc., and the retention of nutriments and the manifestation of energy.

The 33rd Karika is very important from our point of view. It states that the ten external senses present objects constructed by the internal three. Trayasya Viṣayākhyam means "Such as manifest the objects of the internal three." This means that they present the objects as constructed by the internal three out of the undifferentiated presentations of the external ten. The ten senses, being always concerned with the presentation of objects, are confined to the *present*. Presentness or the present moment goes with presentation. This is the true view of the present. The internal three are concerned with all the three divisions of time, viz. past, present and future. This shows that time with its divisions is a logical construct. The same is true of space, though there is no distinct mention of it. It is the necessary construct of the act of position and presentation.

In the 28th Karika we are told that the function or Vṛtti of the five Buddhi-Indriyas is, in respect of sound, etc. Ālocanamātram. This term means mere presentation. What is presented is a relatively undifferentiated whole of sound etc. (K. 36). It is the objective in its entirety. The irreducible datum is not a particular but the whole world "shading off from the momentary focus of attention." These senses are the functions involved in the Adhyavasaya of Buddhi and are hence instrumental in the position and presentation of the objective.

It should not be understood either that Indriyas, by themselves can present or that the presented datum is absolutely devoid of interpretation. Ālocanamatram of Indriyas is made possible by the setting, viz. the context of the internal Karṇas in which they are found. The absolutely unqualified datum is a postulate of thought ; for, to know it even as datum or objective (Viṣaya) means enlargement or interpretation. Avyakta is thus a postulate of thought. There is nothing more 'Sūkṣma' or subtle than it. But to know it as a presentative-conative-affective continuum means greater differentiation or more definite interpretation. The interpretation proceeds from Guṇas to Tanmātras, from Tanmātras to Bhūtas till the concrete world or the objective is presented. Linga is, for this reason, co-eval with Jñā-Avyakta. Reality is thus a continuous but systematic interpretation of experience.

Karṇas of interpretation are Manas, Ahaṅkāra and Buddhi. Their function is perception, inference and Āptavacana as explained by us. Manas, as Vācaspati says, enlarges the undifferentiated presentation into what we have called judgments of identity e. g. this (presented datum) is a jar (in the world of objects). The ancient writer, quoted by Vācaspati, says, "At first, one observes a certain object without qualifications, and latterly intelligent people think of the object as belonging to a certain class and having certain properties." This is the meaning of Saṅkalpa and it is the peculiar function of Manas (K. 27). Mānas, therefore, corresponds to the function of attention, and makes perceptive judgments possible. It should be clearly remembered that the functioning of Manas presupposes Buddhi and Ahaṅkāra and implies the sense-functions. Peculiar functioning should not be mistaken for independent or isolated functioning.

Manas is an Indriya ; for it is, as the etymology of Indriya goes, the characteristic of Indra or Puruṣa. Vācaspati is perplexed by the fact that Indriya so inter-

preted would include even Ahaṅkāra and Buddhi. But they have been distinguished from Indriyas. He gets over the difficulty by saying "that the etymological meaning of Indriya need not form its connotation."¹ He says that Manas is a sense because it is the modification of Ahaṅkāra. He could not see that the etymology does not conflict with the connotation simply because Ahaṅkāra is the symbol of Jñāna and consequently, is not a characteristic of Puruṣa, but is Puruṣa itself. Buddhi, however, is unique, for it is the function of self-position and self-transcendence. It is thus distinguishable from the Ego and yet it comes out through the Ego as Manas and the senses named after it, and expresses the connection of meaning between Jñāna and Puruṣa.

The 2nd line of the 27th Kārikā means that the differentiated sense-functions are the differentiations of Manas. So are the differentiated sense-objects, for the functioning of Indriyas means the presentation of Tanmātras. All these, however, are the various specifications of Guṇas. They are the Guṇa-specifications of the transcendental Bhāvas of Jñāna.

The function of Ahaṅkāra in knowledge is thus to differentiate the sense-functions from the sense-objects i.e. to differentiate the object from itself. Abhimāna is self-consciousness as distinguished from the object-consciousness e.g. the judgment "this (presented datum) is a jar (in the world) and as such is distinguished from me." The presented datum is not identified with the interpreting subject on account of this self-distinguishing objective reference of the Ego. Sāṃkhya thus may well say that "perception is a unique relation in which the Ego stands to the object which owes its existence to its own activity of attention."

¹ Dr. Jha's translation.

Buddhi is Adhyavasaya. It is the chief function as connected with Darśana of Jīva. •It is the essence of Puruṣa and is the ground of all the experiences of Puruṣa in Science, Morality and Art. It is all-comprehensive in its functions and is involved in the position, presentation, construction, comprehension and transcendence of Ahaṅkāra as a self-conscious world. In knowledge it may be said to transform the true-for-me into the true-for-all. It takes us from the perceptual level to the level of science and philosophy, from *my* truth to rational comprehension.

These are the peculiar functions of the three internal Karāṇas. They are unique. The general function pertains to the maintenance of the five vital airs. Does it mean that all living creatures are potentially rational and intelligent and symbols of Linga? Is the animal consciousness implicitly a judging consciousness?

The 30th Kārikā states how the Karāṇas function in knowledge. This has not been rightly construed.

Dr. G. N. Jha has translated it thus : With regard to visible objects, the functions of the four are said to be instantaneous as well as gradual; with regard to invisible objects, the functions of the three (internal organs) are preceded by that (*i. e.* the cognition of some visible object).

We propose to interpret and translate it thus :—

The functions of the four, *viz.* the three internal and any one of the external Karāṇas are instantaneous and *may also* be gradual. The question here is: Does 'gradual' mean the successive functioning of Karāṇas one after the other? This interpretation is not consistent with the structure of Linga. Linga, being a synthetic unity, functions as a whole. We have already noticed that peculiar function does not mean isolated functioning. Indeed Karāṇas function as one. The function of each rests on the whole.

The next question is : If so, what is meant by the gradual functioning ? It means the gradual elaboration of the presented datum (involving the simultaneous functioning of all) through hypothesis and demonstration. In other words, it refers to inferential construction.

Lastly, it may be asked : How can inference which is Atindriya be said to involve the fourth *viz.* the external Karāṇa ? The reply is given in the 2nd line. It is: Both in perception (Drṣṭa) and in inference (Adṛṣṭa) the function of the fourth *viz.* the external Karāṇa is involved. Inferential construction, as we have seen, is an elaboration or systematisation of perceptual construction. Adṛṣṭa may also include Āptavacana, for knowledge necessarily involves objective reference.

In the 35th Kārikā it has been stated that Buddhi with the internal Karāṇas of Ahankara and Manas is involved in the comprehension of the objective. For this reason, the three internal Karāṇas may be said to be the door-keepers and the ten external ones the doors. This is not a very happy metaphor. It suggests that ready-made objects enter through the gates of the senses and that the door-keepers simply regulate their entry.

But the whole context of the Sāṃkhya philosophy rebels against any such suggestion. The 36th Kārikā is the complete refutation of the 35th. There it is said that the different Karāṇas manifest the Meaning of Puruṣa in its entirety and present it to Buddhi. This is a function that is certainly not identical with the functions of the gate-keepers and the gates as ordinarily understood. The metaphor, however, may be interpreted consistently with what has been said in the 31st Kārikā, *viz.* that the function of the Karāṇas is wholly and solely dependent on Puruṣartha. The external senses are called gates simply because they are only presentative and not interpretative. The internal Karāṇas are called gate-keepers because they are interpretative and not presentative.

In the 37th Karika we are told that Buddhi accomplishes all Pratyupabhoga of Puruṣa and also distinguishes between Pradhāna and Puruṣa, though the distinction is highly subtle. Pratyupabhoga does not mean torments and afflictions nor does it mean enjoyment in the ordinary acceptance of the term. It means experience in its most comprehensive sense. It may be translated as 'enjoyment' provided we take it in the sense in which Delisle Burns has used it in his book called "The Contact between Minds". We cannot help quoting one very important passage. It runs thus : "Enjoyment is at one end, contemplation at the other. Enjoyment gradually approaches contemplation in which 'the object,' arises. Being passes into being known. * * * The continuity of the series is perfect and it is an infinite series. But the factors of reality which are the members of one series or another remain definitely separate." Pratyupabhoga really covers both 'enjoyment and contemplation.'

Buddhi is really the ground of all enjoyment and contemplation. As the function of Adhyavasaya and as non-different from Bhava of Darśana or Draṣṭṛtva, it is the sole constructive principle of all enjoyed and contemplated realities, Buddhi is Jñā positing, constructing and comprehending itself as Liṅga-Puruṣa and thus it involves Avyakta or Pradhāna.

As the ground of self-comprehension, Buddhi "exposes the subtle difference" between Pradhāna and Puruṣa. But this cannot mean the separation of Pradhāna from Puruṣa and the final annihilation of Pradhāna. Distinguishing is always distinguishing differences in a unity and not cancelling the differences in favour of an abstract fictitious unity. The terms distinguished are as essential to the unity as the unity is to the terms distinguished. Buddhi is the ground of differentiation and Buddhi is again the connection of meaning between the terms differentiated.

It is this conception of Buddhi that makes Sāṃkhya the rationalistic theory of Reality and Life that it is and sets it in opposition to any cult of Mysticism and Mokṣa. It is this Buddhi that has conceived and propounded the theory of Vyaktavyakta-jña. The Kārikas that have described the aspects of this unity in their relations and distinctions bear ample proof of our interpretation. Sāṃkhya Buddhi unequivocally demands the selfless devotion to and cultivation of Science, Morality and Art. It is, indeed, an irony of fate that we should find Sāṃkhya as the champion of a self-centred doctrine of individual salvation that denies the natural-social or better, the logical-moral order.

CHAPTER X.

Linga as Karta.

We have seen in the last chapter how Liṅga-Puruṣa constructs reality as a system of objects. We have now to see what Liṅga as Karta performs. Karta means an agent or performer of actions. These actions are distinguished from the actions involved in the construction of reality or knowledge. They have been called in Saṃkhyā Karma-indriyas and are distinguished from Buddhi-Indriyas. To define the nature of Liṅga as Karta it is necessary, therefore, to ascertain the meaning and nature of Karma-Indriyas.

We have seen that Indriya means sense-function and also that it is a differentiation of Ahaṅkāra and is implied in Buddhi. Karma-Indriyas agree with Buddhi-Indriyas in being functions. Buddhi-Indriyas are logical functions. But what is the nature of Karma-Indriyas?

The account of these Indriyas given in the texts is very meagre and commentators have made it extremely misleading. In the 26th Kārikā we are told that they are the vocal organ, hands, feet, the organ of excretion (rectum) and of generation (sex). But these should be called physiological organs rather than functions. In the 28th Kārikā we are told that the functions are Vacana, Ādāna, Viharāṇa, Utsarga and Ānanda. It is customary to identify Vacana with the function of the vocal organ, Ādāna with that of the hands, Viharāṇa with that of the feet, Utsarga with that of the rectum and Ānanda with that of the sexual organ.

This identification of Vacana etc., with the functions of the physiological organs of speech etc., is partly ambiguous and partly unwarranted. It is ambiguous to say e.g. that Viharāṇa is the function of the feet. It creates

the impression that the mental life behind it can be totally dropped. Is walking mere aimless treading on the ground? Is Vacana mere production of sounds by the vocal organ? Is Ādāna the function of the hands merely? It is easy to see that these physiological functions presuppose, in any intelligible form, non-physiological functions. Vacana to be intelligible must be the communication of ideas and meanings through language. Similarly, Ādāna and Viharāṇa presuppose some sort of understanding.

It is unwarranted simply because Utsarga and Ānanda, as functions of Liṅga, must again mean something non-physiological. The function of excretion is only an organic function controlled by one or other of the vital airs. It cannot be placed on the same level with speech etc., which are intelligent functions. Ānanda, again, is not an emotional state but an active function. It cannot be the function of sexual gratification, for Liṅga, as we have seen, is sexually undifferentiated, and yet Ānanda is one of the functions that enter into its constitution. The utmost that can be said, consistently with the definition of Liṅga given in Ch. V, is that Ānanda may be the ground of sex-differentiation, and at the same time may tend to transcend sex.

We are inclined to hold, however, that Vacana etc., as Karma-functions, are distinguished from Buddhi-sense-functions, in as much as they are non-theoretical social functions. In the language of Delisle Burns, they are the different forms of the 'enjoyment of other minds.' They signify the relation of Puruṣas to one another. Vacana is communication. Viharāṇa is not walking but enjoying company or the relation of fellowship. Ādāna meaning 'taking' implies the assertion of rights; while Utsarga means devotion and involves the discharging of duties. Ānanda is the fountain-head of all artistic construction. Ānanda as much as Art is a social function.

Mokṣavādi may be interested in divesting Karma-Indriyas of their social significance but it is there all the same. The terms Vacana etc., are intelligible only as social functions of Linga. The necessary place given to these Indriyas in the constitution of Linga shows definitely that it is a social being. Its consciousness is a social consciousness. It shows further that Puruṣa is the central principle of society which is a system of relations grounded on the 'enjoyment' of other Puruṣas. In this connection attention may be drawn to the famous declaration of Yajñavalkya to Maitreyī in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.¹

Each Puruṣa finds in his world other Puruṣas and the relations in which he stands to them are indicated by Karma-Indriyas. They, therefore, raise the question of morality in the context of the rational life of Puruṣa. Buddhi or Viveka demands that every Puruṣa must acquit himself properly. He must respect rationality in himself and in others. Irrational Vacana etc., are unbecoming of Puruṣa. The problem of morality in Saṃkhya is a problem of right and wrong and not one of good and bad. Moral conduct is action according to reason or the discharging of the functions of Vacana etc., in a manner worthy of the rational Puruṣa. Saṃkhya does not tempt by rewards or threaten by punishments. Nor does it posit any end outside the proper functioning itself. Even self-realisation is not an end outside the Karma-functions. The self is realised in every rational act. This act does not aim at its own annihilation in any Mokṣa outside the act but ever tends to maintain itself in its proper rationality. Morality in Saṃkhya means the maintenance of the rational-social or the moral order.

Saṃkhya has stated quite unambiguously the virtues of character. They are the functions of Sattvīkī Buddhi

¹ Ch. IV, Br. 5.

and are Dharma, Jñāna, Virāga and Aiśvarya. It is significant that Dharma etc., have been associated with Buddhi and not with Ahaṅkāra. Ahaṅkāra is and must always be subservient to Buddhi. Buddhi is the principle of self-position and ever demands that this self should not set itself against it. Ahaṅkāra as a function is required to function in accordance with Buddhi or Reason and Conscience. It demands Dharma or justice involving the taking and the giving of dues, Jñāna or wisdom or the knowledge of the essential rational-moral nature of Puruṣa, Virāga or temperance as distinguished from self-aggrandisement and Aiśvarya or the power born of the consciousness of being rational and conscientious. These correspond to the four cardinal virtues of Plato and are, like them, at once personal and social.

Puruṣa is thus required by its own nature to maintain its inborn rationality in the Karma-functions of Vacana, Ādāna etc., and live in spiritual fellowship with other Puruṣas. We are reminded of Kant's famous principle : "Act so as to treat humanity whether in thine own person or in that of any other as an end-in-itself and never as a means only." Sāṃkhya would say : Act like true Purusa respecting rationality in you and the same in others. This is Dharma.

Sāṃkhya has no religion. It is first a logical theory and then an ethical theory. Logic and Ethics, knowledge and morality, Jñāna and Karma are the two distinguishable but inseparable aspects of Reality and Life. Life is not an evil. Its ideal is not Mokṣa or self-annihilation because it involves the denial of Karma-Jñāna-construction. It is only to ensure this that both Jñānen-driyas and Karmendriyas have been recognised as the essential elements of the Liṅga-constitution. It is, indeed, a great pity that Duḥkha and Mokṣa should be grafted into Sāṃkhya even though it lodges the most emphatic protest against both.

Sāṃkhya has not only recognised the proper value of Science or Knowledge and Action or Morality but

has also given Art its proper place. Ānanda, we have said, is the function of artistic construction. Sattvika Svaprakāśa Ānanda has been recognised by rhetoricians as the source of all Art. Indeed, it is Ānanda that by its delightful magic imparts to speech the rhythm and melody of poetry and music, and infuses into the dead and dry stone and timber the tenderness and tenement of living imagination. It is Ānanda that is the fountain-head of all Art—music, poetry, dance, drama, architecture and sculpture. Nay, it is Ānanda that is at the root of the differentiation of sex and, therefore, of family, society, state and all the institutions that make up human life. Ānanda, in short, is only another name for æsthetic self-expression.

It is very significant that Sāṃkhya treats Art as a function and, what is more, a sense-function. More significant still is the fact that Ānanda has no rights against Buddhi, the principle of self-determination in Science and Morality.

It is said that Dharma takes one above and Adharma pulls him down. It means that justice elevates, while injustice degenerates. The one shows the rational in man, the other the brute in him. Similarly, Virāga or self-control means Prakṛitilayah *i.e.* subordination of Prakṛti or the causal spontaneity to the cause of self-determination or Puruṣartha. Rāga is responsible for Samsāra *i.e.* other-determination as distinguished from self-determination. Aiśvarya removes impediments, while feebleness multiplies them. Ajñāna is bondage. Jñāna ensures Apavarga *i.e.* the removal of bondage and assertion of freedom. The issue as conceived by Sāṃkhya is plain. It is for man to decide whether he would assert his right of self-determination or allow himself to be the vassal of the psycho-bio-physical order and forego his rationality.

Sāṃkhya does not believe in Dharma or Karma in the sense of the performance of Vedic sacrifices and

ascetic practices. Its Karmayoga is the rational self-determination in Vacāna, Ādāna, Viharāṇa, Utsarga and Ānanda. Yoga of Sāṃkhya is "Karmasu Kouśalam." Linga as Kartā is, therefore, constructive of a moral order (and the order of aesthetic construction and self-enjoyment) in the very same way as Linga as 'Cetana' Puruṣa is constructive of the logical order. The same Buddhi is both Reason and Conscience. Puruṣārtha means both the rational and the moral order, both science and conduct. But conduct presupposes science, Kartā Puruṣa presupposes Akartā Jñā, Karma-Indriyas presuppose the function of the Buddhi-Indriyas (K. 34).

Buddhi demands that Ahaṅkāra should transcend itself (1) for the sake of science or truth, and abandon false beliefs and erroneous convictions ; (2) for the sake of the moral order, and abandon wrong conventions and destroy unjust institutions ; (3) for the sake of the true enjoyment of the beautiful, and rise above the psycho-bio-physical tendencies not reformed by reason and conscience. The true Karmayogi is thus one who has realised this three-fold self-transcendence. This is realised in the cultivation of the eight Siddhis. Siddhi is said to be perfection. Perfection, in Sāṃkhya, is perfect action and not inaction. It is the action according to Reason and Conscience.

Reality, according to the Sāṃkhya philosophy, is, therefore, an Eternal Construction or Act. It is the realisation of a logical, moral and artistic order (Bhāvākhyā) through the medium of a psycho-bio-physical order (Liṅgākhyā). To be is to act. Action is the essence of everything. Rest is only diversion of activity. He who wants to swim against this ever-flowing current and aims at the annihilation, instead of the rationalisation, of action, commits suicide. Whoever fixes his eyes on eternal rest is engaged in a wild goose chase.

CHAPTER XI.

Viparyaya, Asakti, Tuṣṭi and Siddhi.

We have seen that, according to Sāṃkhya, Reality is the construction of the logical order and then the construction of the moral order. Now, the logical order implies a struggle against error and the moral order, a struggle against evil and imperfection. It follows, therefore, that Sāṃkhya must, consistently with its position, propound a theory of error and evil.

In the 46th Karikā we are told that this Pratyayasarga is characterised by Viparyaya and Asakti, and Tuṣṭi and Siddhi. It may be mentioned in passing that Pratyayasarga means logical construction or construction by predication (Pratyaya) or judgment. This includes moral construction or judgments of right and wrong along with the judgments of true and false and of beautiful and ugly.

Viparyayas include, therefore, both logical and moral perversity. They are five in number. They have been called (1) Tamas, (2) Moha, (3) Mahāmoha, (4) Tamisra and (5) Andhatamisra. There seems to be something like a gradation among these Viparyayas. They have, again, sixty-two subdivisions. These names signify, to our mind the reverses of Buddhi. We are told in the 23rd Karikā that Buddhi with predominating Sattva discharges the five functions of Adhyavasāya, Dharma, Jñāna, Virāga and Aisvarya. But Buddhi with predominant Tamas functions in the reverse way. These reverses of the five Buddhi-functions are the five Viparyayas. They are either moral or logical. Under moral Viparyayas we get Adharma, Rāga and Dourbalya. Ajñāna is both logical and moral. It is the ignorance both of the true and of the right. We are not in a position to say which of these is Tamas, which again is Moha, and so on. Again, we

are not in a position to say what principles of division have been employed in enumerating the subdivisions of each. We can, however, say with certainty that Viparyayas are false theories and wrong practices. As such they include all the typical schools of thought and culture that are different from the theory of Vyaktavyaktajña. Consequently they include Ritualism, Asceticism, Mysticism, Occultism, Passivism, Naturalism, Theism, Subjectivism, Scepticism and all other *isms* of their brand.

Asaktis are abnormal and pathological conditions. They are 28 in number and are either physiological or psychological. They are the disabilities of the eleven senses and the reverses of nine Tuṣṭis and eight Siddhis.

The recognition of Viparyayas and Asaktis is a necessary consequence of the logical outlook of Saṃkhyā. But recognition is one thing and explanation is another. What is the explanation of error and evil ? We are told by Saṃkhyā that they are all incident to the preponderance of Tamas and the consequent suppression of Sattva. It means, in other words, that errors and evils are necessary phases of the Pratyayasarga that Reality is. It may be asked : When everything is the symbolisation of Jñā or Puruṣartha, why should there be Viparyayas and Asaktis i.e. the reverses and disabilities ? Why should Tamas predominate over Sattva ? How is perfection compatible with error and evil ?

The answer lies in the fact that Saṃkhyā does not regard perfection as a state outside the act. Perfection is perfect construction and as such it involves a conflict with and a triumph over the imperfect, the disorderly and the chaotic. The imperfections are error and evil. Truth is a campaign against Bandhas. Morality is a campaign against injustice or Adharma and Ānanda against the ugly and the deformed. These imperfections are thus

the necessary phases of Pratyayasarga. They are not non-existent but real as phases and unreal as wholes. They are real as reverses but unreal as normal functions. Adharma and Ajñāna are thus inherent in the very structure of Reality.

In the domain of the logical construction, we have seen, that the Bhautika order has to be explained by the Tānmatrika, the latter again by Avyakta and lastly, Avyakta by Jñāna. It is an error to take as ultimate any one of these at the expense of others. Error is partial truth which serves as a stepping-stone to a wider truth or a case of false identification or Anyathākhyati. The moral reverses are the concomitants of the errors and are like them partial and one-sided. They are rooted in Rāga or attachment to the body in preference to reason and conscience and due to the predominance of Tamas in Buddhi and the consequent over emphasis on Ahaṅkāra. They lead to self-aggrandisement, injustice and cowardice. Morality is, however, not a denial of the parts, viz. Ahaṅkāra etc., but the employment of all to the all-embracing cause of Truth, Justice and Ānanda.

Error and evil thus are indispensable, necessary and eternal phases of the Real. They are not self-existent but rest on the positive real. Error is, as Bosanquet says, existence of one kind claiming to have in addition existence of another kind which it has not. The same may be said of evil. Viparyaya and Aśakti, therefore, are not due to any other principle but are incident to the self-differentiation of Jñāna.

But this is not all. If real construction be characterised by reverses and disabilities, it is also characterised by Tuṣṭis and Siddhis. These indicate the line of struggle against error and evil. The recognition of Tuṣṭis and Siddhis proves our contention that, according to Sāṃkhya, Reality is a never-ending campaign against and conquest

of error and evil. "The errors perish in every act of thought and in every act of thought are born anew". Similarly, the evils perish in every conduct and in every conduct are born anew. This incessant struggle against error and evil is the lot of life. Though unceasing, the struggle is neither tiring nor depressing but on the other hand, quite enjoyable. The secret of success is found in the practice of Tuṣṭis and Siddhis. These are the keys to power and perfection.

Tuṣṭis have been absolutely misrepresented by Vācaspati. The way in which he has described them shows that he has really given an account of the reverses of Tuṣṭi. The reason for our contention is simply the statement in Kārikā 49 that the reverse of Tuṣṭi is Aśakti. It is, therefore, perfectly legitimate to conclude that Tuṣṭis are not disabilities but means to power. Is it, however, a means to power to suppose that Puruṣartha will be realised in course of time, or by making a show of acting for it, or as a natural culmination, or as a gift of destiny or fate? Are these marks of Sakti or power or sincere determination to be a Puruṣa worth the name? Yet Vācaspati wants us to believe that. No, Tuṣṭis are neither erroneous notions nor the excuses for the idler's reliance on Nature or Time or Fate or paraphernalia. Tuṣṭi is the sense of power born of the firm conviction that every thing, the whole machinery of the universe will submit to the demands of rational and moral meaning. Nature conditions, opportunities and even destiny will follow the determined Puruṣa like a tame dog. Nothing can go against the cause of Reason and Conscience, of truth and justice. Even error and evil are bound to provide nourishing conditions.

Internal Tuṣṭis are four. They are born of the trust and confidence in the subservience of Prakṛti, means or conditions, time and destiny to Puruṣartha. External Tuṣṭis are five, born of the sense of control over the five objects of sense or Virāga. Such is the concept of

Tuṣṭis which the anti-activistic Mokṣavādin could not help distorting and disfiguring beyond recognition. It may be urged against our interpretation of Tuṣṭi that in Karika 51 the first three, viz. Viparyaya, Aśakti and Tuṣṭi have been said to be the checks to Siddhi. But this is a misconstruction of the passage “Siddheḥ Pūrvah Aṅkuśah Trividhah”. In the first place, ‘Aṅkuśah’ need not mean that which deters. It may also, and more properly, mean that which stimulates. In the second place, ‘Pūrvah Trividhah’ means the first three Siddhis, viz. Uha Sabda and Adhyayana. These three are the principal Siddhis and the rest depend on them. The fundamental Siddhi is the conquest of ignorance.

Siddhis are eight. They are Uha, Sabda, Adhyayana, the conquest of the three Bandhas, Suhṛtpṛapti and Dāna. Uha is equivalent to Jijñāsa or questioning. It is the realisation of the problem of existence and life made possible by the conflicts inherent in Reality. The second Siddhi is to listen and learn. It is Sabda i.e. receiving instructions from the wise and expert. Sabda does not mean only hearing. It implies understanding as well. Hearing is nothing without understanding. But even this is not ultimate. The expert may be mistaken or misunderstood. Hence the third Siddhi is Adhyayana. One must, by private study and contemplation, verify and realise for himself the truth of what he has learnt. (Āptavacana).

This free and unfettered exercise of Reason ensures the comprehension of Puruṣartha i.e. rational order or truth and moral order or justice. It means the conquest of three Bandhas. Freed from bondage and unworthy cares and anxieties, one realises the identity of the personal existence with the inner rational and moral order and thus deserves to be the friend of all. Suhṛtpṛapti means deserving to be trusted as a friend. Spiritual fellowship transcends all limitations of body, caste, religion and nationality and is born of the whole-hearted devotion to the interests of the rational and moral order. It means

therefore, Dāna or the devotion of all to the cause of Truth, Justice and Freedom. He alone is the friend of humanity who is not swayed by considerations of personal gain and loss but has definitely taken his stand under the banner of Truth and Justice or, what is the same thing, has dedicated himself to the establishment of a society of free Puruṣas. Spiritual fellowship demands sound reason, clear conscience and serene blissfulness. It holds in its hands the olive branch of peace but never hesitates to lodge the most emphatic protest and wage the most vigorous campaign against error and evil or Viparyaya and Aśakti or Rāga, Bandha and Ajñāna.

Thus we find that Pratyayasarga is perpetually in a state of war. But it is not a war of greed and avarice, of dogma and oppression, of exploitation and tyranny. It is a fight for Truth and Justice against all that is untrue and unjust. It is a fight between Truth and error, between Justice and injustice, between Sattva and Tamas. It is the Kurukṣetra that is being daily and hourly fought out. The seeds of conflict and of conquest are both rooted in Reality. Life is a perpetual struggle. It is for the human person to illumine the darkness of ignorance and win over the forces of self-willed tyranny and bigoted oppression. It is for him or her to refuse to submit to the disruptive myrmidons of the benighted devil and insist on the establishment of Dharmarajya or the kingdom of Truth and Justice and on the inherent value of Science, Morality and Art.

This is the Karinayoga of the Sāṃkhya philosophy so ably expounded in the Gīta. Sāṃkhya does not believe in inaction. It firmly adheres to the view that there are acts and acts. The renunciation of one does not mean the renunciation of another. In fact, renunciation itself is an act which means the assertion of the claims of Truth and Justice over those of untruth and injustice.

The question may be asked : What then ? What is the upshot of this struggle ? Will it ever end ? Is there

any getting out of this field of battle ? Is there any life outside this contest ? Sāṃkhya cannot consistently maintain any end of conflict outside it or any termination of the struggle. Pratyayasarga or self-construction of Reality is bound to split itself up and be engaged in the struggle for self-conquest. It is a perpetual splitting-up of harmony and a perpetual call for readjustment of relations. There is triumph but the triumph is in the fight and there is also the seed of battle in triumph. The belief in the final extinction of the conflict and in Mokṣa as the consequence of the acts of Siddhi outside them is, according to Sāṃkhya, a sign of wild imagination. Truth and Justice are not the means to an end outside them. They are their own ends or ends-unto-themselves. Puruṣartha is its own end and is ever being realised in Science and Society. An act done for any consequence outside it, for a motive other than the maintenance of the rational-moral order which is the soul of the act itself is condemned as unrighteous. True act is Niṣkama. It does not aim at any end outside it. There is Mokṣa in the sense of liberation from bondage and misery. But it means in Sāṃkhya self-transcendence which does not cancel the conflict but assures the assertion of Truth and Justice. Sri Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna could transcend the consideration of personal gain and loss but could not avoid the battle of Kurukṣetra and, what is more, taking the most prominent part in it.

The Pāṇḍavas are the heroes of Kurukṣetra, simply because they were guided by considerations of Truth and Justice. They were fighting for enthroning Yudhiṣṭhira, the incarnation of Dharma. Theirs were the parts of the fellows or brothers of Dharmarāja. Theirs was the life dedicated to the cause of Truth and Justice.

Self-transcendence is not the negation of action. It is the negation of re-action or better interaction. It is action directed towards the one all-embracing Puruṣartha. Self-transcendence is so far removed from inaction

that it is only Muktapuruṣa or the free person that can be said to act. Others are at the mercy of causal determination. The free alone act; for, action is self-determination as distinguished from predetermination or mechanical interaction or Kriya or Saṃsāra.

This action of Muktapuruṣa or Puruṣartha does not employ any mystic powers. It acts through the instrumentality of the universal causal machinery. It employs Nimittanaimittikaprasaṅga towards the realisation of itself. The battle of Truth and Justice has to be fought with the instruments provided by Avyakta. Hence we are told in the 52nd Karika that there are no Lingas without Bhāvas and no realisation of Bhāvas without Liṅga. The construction that Reality is, has thus two aspects, the aspect of rational meaning implying moral meaning and the aspect of the instrumental Liṅga. One can never be found without the other.

CHAPTER XII.

Kārikās 53 to 68.

We have tried to show in the foregoing pages that the whole Saṁkhya philosophy is contained in the first 52 Kārikās. There is nothing more to be added after the description of Tuṣṭis and Siddhis. Mokṣavādin, however, is bound to miss one thing. It is Mokṣa or the absolute termination of the conflict between Sattva and Tamas, the final rest in an eternal indescribable state of actionless bliss, a complete negation and annulment of all that is due to Avyakta. But it must be there. How can a philosophy, he must have argued, be taken as complete when it does not lead to a state of absolute rest, a cessation of all actions, of all thoughts, of the entire Pratyayasarga ? So Buddhi, the chief functionary, must also be transcended and negatived. Avyakta must be absolutely neutralised and the *lame* Puruṣa must be left as looking on a blank and yet fully realised. In the foregoing pages we have tried to bring out the impossibility of deducing such a doctrine from the first 52 Kārikās. We shall now discuss each of the sixteen added Kārikās and try to establish our contention.

K. 53. The distinction between gods and men is inconsistent with the philosophy of the previous Kārikās. Even gods must be the specifications of Liṅga, and hence Puruṣa. It is possible to distinguish between Puruṣa and Puruṣa on the basis of moral and logical attainments but to set a genus of god with eight species including Yakṣas, Rākṣasas and Piśācas against the human Person betrays an absolute misunderstanding of the philosophy of Vyaktavyaktajña. It was obviously introduced to explain Ādhidaivika Duḥkha. But if man can overcome Ādhidaivika Duḥkha by Vijnāna, he must be superior to Adhidevas. Again, as these Devas are mischievous, they

cannot be said to be Sattvika. (For the true meaning of Adhideva see Ch. I).

K. 54. (a) It is meaningless to say that the aerial regions are predominantly Sattvika and the earth is predominantly Tamasika. We have already been told that Man is the devil and Man is god. The highest enlightenment of Sattva and the darkest defilement of Tamas are all phases of human thought and action and Man lives on earth.

(b) It seems to indicate the existence of other Lokas or worlds than the one which man is aware of constructing in thought and action. The structure of Liṅga, however, denies the existence of heavens and hells.

K. 55. The conscious Puruṣa, like a plaything, may be swayed to and fro by the causal process. He may also submit to Duḥkha. But it is certainly a serious blunder or Bandha to say that Duḥkha due to 'old age and death' is co-extensive with life and that Liṅga must lapse back into Avyakta in order to be freed from this perennial misery. Nowhere in the first 52 Kārikās have we been told that Liṅga is dissolved. On the other hand, they have definitely stated that Liṅga is Niyata and is surcharged with the universal causal dynamism of Prakṛiti. What is more, Liṅga has been said to be supportless or abstract without Viśeṣas. In this Kārika Mokṣavādin has prepared his ground. But he wants us to forget that Sattvīki Buddhi is as much involved in Reality as Tamasīki Buddhi. He wants us to forget also Siddhis and the whole philosophy behind them.

K. 56. This raises some very important issues. It states (a) that the unfoldment of Avyakta has a motive, (b) that this motive is Mokṣa of each Puruṣa.

It follows, therefore, (1) that Avyakta can act purposefully and even infallibly, (2) that there are many Puruṣas, (3) that each Puruṣa is constitutionally in a state of bondage i.e. imperfect, (4) that perfection is

something different from the state in which Puruṣas naturally exist prior to the unfoldment of Avyakta, (5) that this unfoldment begins and ends in time, (6) that to be real it must achieve something and (7) that the process of construction is from the imperfect to the perfect.

These are some of the undeniable consequences of the position taken up in the 56th Karika. We shall see presently how absurd these are in themselves and how incompatible they are with the philosophy of the 52 Karikas already discussed. Before we pass on to the next Karika, it is necessary to point out that Ārambha or the beginning of the unfoldment of Avyakta is incompatible with any true interpretation of Satkāryavāda. If Avyakta can exist even for a moment without the effect, it must exist eternally in that state. Consequently, if Ārambha is at all to take place, some other factor must come in.

K. 57. If some other factor must come in, it is not a sufficient explanation to say that the instinctive immanent teleology of Avyaka accounts for its unfoldment. The motive of the liberation of each Puruṣa is part and parcel of Avyakta and the Bondage of each Puruṣa is also given. If they be adequate, Sarga must be as eternal as they are. If they be inadequate, Sarga can never take place. Either, therefore, there is no Ārambha or Ārambha is impossible.

K. 58. The author is evidently aware of the difficulty of the situation and he is found struggling very hard to get out of it. He has added one more Karika to solve the insoluble. In Karika 58 he suggests that there is some curiosities in Avyakta which leads it to act. Is the curiosities a passing phase that is no further explicable? If so, this is the end of Vijnāna and Satkāryavāda. If not, it would mean the end of Ārambha. We cannot afford to forget here the 21st Karika which refers to Jñā's Darśana as the logical ground of the objective construction. We can understand very well how

and why the category of Jñā was forced into the background and Puruṣa was substituted for it. We may ask : What differentiates one Puruṣa from another before the operation of Avyakta ? What is it, again, that accounts for Bandha of Puruṣas when Liṅga is absent and lying wholly dissolved in Avyakta ? If unfoldment be due to bondage, Puruṣa must be conceived as essentially vitiated. How can Avyakta lead infallibly to Mokṣa under the guidance of such a Puruṣa ?

K. 59. (a) Prakṛti ceases to be something blind and appears now in the role of a dancing girl.¹ One may very well question the propriety of such a metaphor, for Pratyayasarga is not wholly a display of Tamas and Moha. The part of Prakṛti in Science, Morality and Art has neither been denied nor considered as negligible. Does it not show clearly that the author of Kārikās 10, 11, 15, 16 etc. could not have written the 59th ? Is it not clear also that the latter owes itself to a world-hater while the former must have been conceived by a truly rational and scientific thinker ?

(b) It suggests that the display is as spontaneous as the disappearance. Like the dancing girl Prakṛti seems to go through a certain fixed programme and retire when it is completed. Does it mean that displaying on the part of Prakṛti is bound to mean Duḥkhaniyṛtti on the part of Puruṣa ? Is it then true to say that there is no distinction between seeing fully and seeing truly and behaving rightly ?

(c) How can the wily Prakṛti be said to work for the salvation of Puruṣa ? What is the part of Puruṣa both in organising and in learning the lesson of this show ?

K. 60. Here the dancing girl is transformed into something like a devoted partner working unselfishly for

¹ It is a serious blunder to suppose that Puruṣa means man and Prakṛiti means woman. Puruṣa is Person and includes both man and woman.

helping Puruṣa to realise his Freedom. Does not this whole-hearted devotion mean an inner relation of meaning between Puruṣartha and Avyakta? This Kārikā contains some clever but very misleading puns.

(a) Upakāri and Anupakāri. These two terms are taken to mean generous and ungrateful respectively. This interpretation suggests relations which can not exist between Jñā and Avyakta. Avyakta has no independent existence. It is only the other or the objective of Jñā. It exists in, for and by Jñā, simply because Jñā means it.

(b) 'Aparthakam Carati' has no sense. Avyakta, being the objective, has no meaning in and for itself. It has meaning for Jñā (Pararthatvat). It does not signify any sacrifice on the part of Prakṛti.

(c) Prakṛti is Guṇavatī not in the sense of possessing all the good qualities of head and heart but in the sense of being a unity of Guṇas. Similarly, Puruṣa (Jñā) is Aguṇa in the sense of being transcendental. It does not imply that Puruṣa is a heartless brute.

We find, therefore, that this Kārikā is a misleading repetition of what has been already defined in Kārikās 17, 19 and 20. It means, in any intelligible sense, that Avyakta is necessarily involved in the self-differentiation and self-construction of Meaning as a logical and moral order.

K. 61. The dancing girl further changes role with a coy maiden. She is so modest that "once aware of having been seen by Puruṣa she does not again expose herself to his gaze." It is clear that Soukṣmyam of Kārikā 8 has become the Sukumārtaram of Kārikā 61. The rest is a metaphorical misrepresentation of "Karyataḥ Tad Upalabdheḥ". It simply means that Prakṛti is the irreducible datum which is never found without an element of interpretation. This Kārikā obviously conflicts with the 65th.

K. 62. Here the cat is coming out of the bag. The efforts of Prakṛti, so long described as solely directed to the

liberation of Puruṣa are now declared as having nothing to do with Puruṣa. Who migrates, who is bound and who is released ? It is Prakṛti and none other than that. The dancing girl is gone, the coy maiden is gone. Instead, we get a self-deluding and also self-liberating Prakṛti. The author is evidently anxious to keep Puruṣa out of the false (?) show and maintain it in its so-called unmoved inactivity. The co-operation of the lame Puruṣa and the blind Prakṛti is a huge hoax. Puruṣa seems to play no part in this display.

K. 63. But Puruṣārtha comes in again as it must. It must also guide the unfoldment of Prakṛti and its liberation but yet there must not be anything like action in Puruṣa. But whose Artha is Puruṣārtha ? Is it Prakṛti's Artha or Puruṣa's Artha ? It must be the latter and, therefore, it is futile to attempt to eliminate the dynamism of Artha from Puruṣa. It is equally vain to suppress the relation that Artha necessarily signifies.

The term Puruṣārtha has caused a lot of embarrassment. If Artha be purpose, Puruṣa must be treated as a purposive agent. But his Akartṛtvā conflicts with it. So this Artha must be transferred to Prakṛti. But even then, it does not cease to be Puruṣārtha for Saṅghāta is Parārtha. It did not strike that this Artha is not purpose but logical meaning which implies, purpose. The logical meaning attributed to Puruṣa (Jñā) does not affect its Akartṛtvā. On the other hand, this is the only consistent interpretation. So interpreted, all the embarrassments disappear like clouds before the shining sun.

K. 64. It conflicts with Kārikā 62, for, it again suggests that Puruṣa is held in bondage and can only get out of it by going through a speculative discipline, viz. "I am not, naught is mine and I do not exist." It is clear that Mayavāda has been covertly brought in, though Saṃkhya emphatically protests against it. According to Saṃkhya, I do certainly exist but I am not a mere biological creature

but a rational-moral psycho-bio-physical and, therefore, a dynamic order. By virtue of my rationality I am one with the universal logical and moral order realised in and through the Pāñcabhautika re-adjustments. Similarly, it is not true to say that naught is mine. The whole world is mine. Mine is to seek Truth and stand for Justice in all my thoughts and deeds and also to bloom forth in æsthetic self-expression. Again I am. I am a Jīva-Adhvāsita-Līṅga-Viśeṣa or a Puruṣa.

Tattvabhyāsa indicated here is obviously inconsistent with Tuṣṭis and Siddhis propounded in Karikās 50 and 51.

K. 65. Here we are told that Puruṣa beholds Prakṛti. But in Karikā 62 we were told that Prakṛti, once aware of having been seen, never exposes herself to the gaze of Puruṣa. We shall discuss afterwards the validity of the concept of Prasavānivṛtti.

K. 66. What is the Prayojana that has been served ? It is evidently a momentary phase. Nor does it seem to be very much necessary ; for, the state before and the state after realisation appear to be identical. (See K. 64).

K. 67. It is for the first time that we hear of Dharma etc. losing all significance.

K. 68. Final and absolute emancipation is said to follow upon the separation of the wise Puruṣa from the corporeal frame. The object of the Mokṣavādin has now evidently been achieved. We have now to see how far it is consistent with the principles of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, apart from the inherent inconsistencies.

We have contended that these Karikas are later additions intended to graft into the Sāṃkhya philosophy Mokṣavāda which is inconsistent with it. Our reasons are many. They are :—

(1) The language of these Karikas is predominantly and viciously metaphorical.

(2) Many of them are but unnecessary and distorted recapitulations of theories already propounded.

(3) The new elements that have been introduced are an undiluted Duḥkhavāda, viz. that life on earth and misery are synonymous, an element of illusiveness affecting the world-construction as a whole, the consequent withdrawal of Vyakta into Avyakta on the attainment of wisdom and thus the termination of life and world.

None of these, however, can be said to be intended by the first fifty-two Kārikās. We have shown already that the presence of Ānanda as a constituent of Linga, the recognition of the virtues of Dharma etc. and the inclusion of Suhṛtpṛapti among Siddhis directly challenge the theory of "Duḥkham Svabhāvena." The theory of Satkāryavāda gives the lie direct to the element of illusiveness attributed to the world-process as a whole. Consequently, the wholesale withdrawal of the world is a figment of the imagination.

The concept of the beginning and the end of the world-process as a whole, does not suit the spirit of the Kārikās. One of the grounds of world-construction is Puruṣasya Darśana. We have shown that Darśana is not a passing phase of Jñāna. Puruṣārtha is not limited and finite. Jñāna and Avyakta are logical presuppositions which always exist in the actual or Vyakta. Consequently, knowledge can not mean a return to the abstract presuppositions. Knowledge cannot mean either Binivṛtti of Avyakta or its final disappearance from the 'gaze' of Puruṣa. Saṃkhyā does not accept the theory of an objectless knowledge, a Jñānamātram. The real is Vyaktavyaktajñāna. The world-process is eternal. It is both beginningless and endless.

Mokṣa of the type described is impossible. Granting that it is possible, the fact that there are many Puruṣas shows clearly that the liberation of one cannot mean the liberation of all. Consequently, the liberation of one cannot mean the dissolution of the world as a whole.

Consequently, the world-order continues to exist. So long as it continues, there cannot be the dissolution of the seven Prakṛti-Vikṛtis. It may be said that the world ceases to exist for the free. The answer is that Avyakta is one and Puruṣas are many. Consequently, it would be more proper to say that Puruṣa is annihilated rather than Avyakta. Would it not again be an imperfection on the part of the liberated Puruṣa (assuming it to exist) to forget the existence of different grades of Puruṣas and thus of the continuance of the world ? What sort of Mokṣa is this ? What sort of knowledge or wisdom is this that is ignorant of the undeniable fact of existence ? If it be said that the Mukta individual is no longer an individual but merges into the universal, we get a different view of the individual and its relation to the universal and this conflicts with the traditional account of the Sāṃkhya theory of many Puruṣas.

The two problems that must be discussed in this context (1) are the problem of personal continuity after death and (2) the problem of transmigration. While facing these problems, we cannot but notice the very significant fact that these two have not received much attention in the Kārikās. May it not be that these fall under Paravāda which has been eliminated from Iśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhya-Kārikā ?

In Kārika 39 we are told that Sūkṣma-Viśeṣaḥ are Niyataḥ i.e. persist. Vacaspati tells us that this Sūkṣma is Parikalpita i.e. something postulated. He tells us further that it has been postulated to account for the transition from one body to another at death. It is something like a vehicle which enables the individual to exist just for the time taken between abandoning one and taking up another Mātāpitṛja body.

As against this, we are told in Kārika 41 that Liṅga is an abstraction without Viśeṣaiḥ. (Mark the plural). It means that Liṅga is an abstraction even when there is

only one Viśeṣa (admitting this to be a possibility). An abstraction can not be said to exist. We find in the Mahabharata (XII, 203, 204) that Liṅga or Puruṣa, apart from the body, is like the moon of the new moon. Existence of Liṅga-Puruṣa is, therefore, always existence as the individual born of parents (Matāpitṛja). Necessarily, the dissolution of the body must be taken to mean the end of the individual. Consequently, there is no rebirth of the same individual and as such there is no necessity for postulating any Viśeṣa for bridging over the gulf between death and what is called rebirth. The persistence of Sūkṣma means only the persistence of the structural design of the individual and not of the individual instance as such.

This design may be said to be the individualising order or principle. The persistence of the individualising principle means persistent individualisation or production of individual instances or incarnation of the design. This incarnation proceeds along the natural physiological processes of impregnation and conception and is subject to the natural laws of life and death. This individualising principle is the Dehi of the Gītā which is eternal and indestructible (Ch. II v. 30) and which rejects the worn-out vesture and renews it (Ch. II v. 22).

So long, however, as the individual born of parents lives, he or she symbolises the rational-moral order that Jñā-Avyakta-Liṅga means. The individual person has value so far as this order is realised in life. It is the principle or order that has value. The individual is valuable for the order. So far, therefore, as any person sets himself or herself against the order, defies and denies it, he or she has no value and the wise never mourn their destruction for the sake of the order of Truth and Justice. (Gītā. Ch. II.) Death or destruction of the individual means neither the destruction of the order nor, consequently, of the continuous flow of individuals.

With the dismissal of the belief in personal continuity after death, go the beliefs in transmigration and Mokṣa. It may be asked : How are the inequalities of life to be accounted for ? We shall say, in the first place, that the inequalities demand solution more than explanation. If the Law of Karma that is usually referred to, in this connection, has served any purpose, it is to minimise the paramount importance of whole-hearted attempts to solve the problem of inequalities. In the next place, Saṃkhyā has never lost sight of the inequalities and has provided for them in the constitution of Avyakta. Variety, inequality, conflict, they are the very laws of life. It is also the law of life to stimulate persistent efforts to solve them. We may go further and say that it is also the law of life that they would never be completely annihilated nor would they be able to completely suppress all efforts to overcome them.

It is left to the human persons to do their bit, to take sides with the forces of Truth and Justice as against those of untruth and injustice. It is in this that true Mokṣa or self-determination or freedom lies. We need not consider the position that personal discontinuity would mean the destruction of all morality. That is, indeed, a vulgar conception of Morality that constantly appeals to rewards and punishments. True morality knows only one appeal and that is the appeal to Reason or the Law of order or Truth and Justice irrespective of consequences.

It is, indeed, an irony of fate that Saṃkhyā passes to-day for exactly that which it has condemned most emphatically, most logically and most unequivocally. After all, Viparyaya and Aśakti are inseparable from Pratyayasarga. But there is hope yet, for Tuṣṭis and Siddhis are equally inseparable.

